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Abstract
We examine the e↵ect of introducing credit default swaps (CDSs) on firm
value. Our model allows for dynamic investment and financing, and bondholders
can trade in the CDS market. The model incorporates both negative and positive
e↵ects of CDSs. CDS markets lead to more liquidations, but they also reduce the
probability of costly debt renegotiation, and reduce costly equity financing. After
calibrating the model, we find that firm value increases by 2.9% on average with
the introduction of a CDS market. Firms also invest more and increase leverage.
The e↵ect on firm value is strongest for small, financially constrained, and low-
productivity firms.
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What is the e↵ect of credit default swaps on firm value? Did the introduction of a market
for credit risk in the 1990s increase the ability of firms to access financing and therefore
improve the broad economy? These questions are fundamentally important, and we argue
that we need a more thorough economic analysis to guide the current policy debate on CDS
contracts. In this paper, we examine the positive and negative e↵ects of CDSs simultaneously
and estimate their net e↵ect on firm value. We show that while the net e↵ect of credit
derivatives on firm value and investment can be positive or negative, it is likely to be positive.
After calibrating our dynamic model to empirical data, we find that for public corporations
in the United States the introduction of the CDS market increases firm value by 2.9% on
average.
The public debate on the welfare e↵ects of CDSs, ignited by the recent financial crisis,
together with CDS-related regulatory changes are evidence for the importance of these results.
Several investors and market commentators have argued that credit derivatives reduce social
welfare and should be regulated. Some even call for a ban on CDSs.1 Around the same
time and in support of the view that CDSs are useful, financial regulators in the U.S. and
Europe have started introducing new rules for the CDS market. On November 1, 2012, the
European Union banned trading in the sovereign CDS market unless investors also buy the
underlying bonds. By 2014, regulators in the U.S. and Europe had implemented rules so
that most trading in the CDS market is cleared by central counterparties.2 Our analysis of
the costs and benefits of CDS markets could be useful for the current policy discussion.
In order to estimate the net e↵ect of CDSs on firm value, we construct a dynamic model
1George Soros wrote in The Wall Street Journal on March 24, 2009, that “CDSs are toxic instruments
whose use ought to be strictly regulated.” Fortune published an article on June 18, 2012, entitled “Why it’s
time to outlaw credit default swaps.” Similar articles were published in the Financial Times, March 6, 2009,
The Atlantic, March 30, 2009, and The New York Times, February 27, 2010.
2Financial Times, October 19, 2011, “EU ban on naked CDS to become permanent,” and “New Rules
for Credit Default Swap Trading: Can We Now Follow the Risk?,” June 24, 2014, Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland.
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with stock, bond, and CDS markets, and calibrate the model to the data. In the model, the
firm optimally chooses investment and financing each period, allowing for equity and debt
issues. Debt holders can trade in the CDS market and purchase or sell CDS protection from
a dealer who sets actuarially fair prices. Each period, the firm optimally decides whether
to repay the debt, to renegotiate with debt holders, or to file for bankruptcy. The model
features several real-life frictions, such as limited commitment of equity holders, as well as
equity issuance, bankruptcy, and renegotiation costs. The calibrated model allows us to do a
counterfactual analysis of what the firm’s value, investment, and financing would be exactly
under the same conditions except for access to credit risk insurance.3
Whether the net e↵ect of a CDS market on firm value is positive or negative in the model
is not clear a priori, because CDSs a↵ect firm value in multiple ways. We show that the
introduction of a CDS market leads to more firm liquidations, which reduces firm value due
to bankruptcy costs. This e↵ect is very similar to the so-called empty creditor problem in
Hu and Black (2008) and Bolton and Oehmke (2011). The intuition is that if bondholders
are hedged with CDS contracts, they demand a higher payo↵ in debt renegotiation, which in
some cases makes renegotiation infeasible.
At the same time, bondholders’ ability to hedge with CDS contracts reduces the probabil-
ity of costly debt renegotiation, which increases firm value. Again, this is because the hedged
bondholders demand a higher payment in debt renegotiation, which makes renegotiation a
less attractive option to the firm. In some states, therefore, the firm chooses to repay the
debt instead of renegotiating it. Also, we show that CDS markets increase the market value
of debt, which leads to a further positive e↵ect on firm value at the point in time when debt
is issued. In some cases, the higher market value of debt allows the firm to buy more capital
with issuing the same face value of debt. Alternatively, it allows the firm to rely less on costly
equity with the same investment in capital and the same face value of debt.
3This methodology is used increasingly in corporate finance to answer questions about capital structure
(e.g., Hennessy and Whited, 2007), financial intermediation (e.g., Schroth et al., 2014), executive compensa-
tion (Taylor, 2010), or agency conflicts (e.g., Nikolov and Whited, 2014).
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The model is able to explain several recent empirical findings. Ashcraft and Santos (2009)
report that CDS contracts have no significant e↵ect on the cost of debt for the average
borrower. Saretto and Tookes (2013) find that firms with CDSs can borrow more and can
maintain higher leverage ratios. Subrahmanyam et al. (2014) report that the introduction of
CDS markets increases the probability of bankruptcy, although this need not imply that firm
value is reduced by CDSs. Using a sample of out-of-court debt restructurings, Danis (2016)
shows that if bondholders are more likely to hold CDSs, an out-of-court debt restructuring
is less successful on average. We show that all of these findings are endogenous outcomes of
our model.
In addition to our findings on the net e↵ect for the average public corporation in the U.S.,
we look at how the e↵ect of CDSs depends on di↵erent firm characteristics. We find that
small firms, financially constrained firms, and low-productivity firms benefit the most from
the introduction of credit derivatives. For other types of firms, the net e↵ect is smaller, but
this does not imply that CDS contracts do not a↵ect them. It is rather that the positive and
negative e↵ects on firm value o↵set each other.
We also test certain predictions of the model in reduced form empirical tests. The purpose
of these tests is not to estimate causal e↵ects, but to check if several endogenous variables
in the model are correlated in a way that is similar to the data. To that end, we first
derive several testable predictions of the model concerning the hedge ratio of bondholders.
The model predicts that the hedge ratio should be positively related to leverage and to the
fraction of non-fixed assets, which is a proxy for liquidation costs, and negatively related to
Tobin’s Q. Since the hedge ratio of bondholders is not observable, we construct a proxy using
data from the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC). The results of these tests
are consistent with the predictions of the model.
Our paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, the literature on the
costs and benefits of introducing CDS markets. From the perspective of the firm, we have
mentioned the empirical findings of Ashcraft and Santos (2009), Saretto and Tookes (2013),
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Subrahmanyam et al. (2014), and Danis (2016). All these contributions try to estimate the
causal e↵ect of CDS contracts on firm outcomes. They use instrumental variables and natural
experiments as plausible sources of exogenous variation. In our model, however, we can easily
compare an economy with and without a CDS market to estimate its purely causal e↵ect on
firm outcomes. On the theoretical side, Bolton and Oehmke (2011) provide a stylized model
that predicts both positive and negative value e↵ects. Outside of corporate finance, there are
several other contributions. Du↵ee and Zhou (2001) and Morrison (2005) examine the e↵ect
of CDS contracts on bank loans. Fostel and Geanakoplos (2012) show how the CDS market
may have contributed to the crash of 2007-2009. Oehmke and Zawadowski (2015) explore
the e↵ect of CDS markets on liquidity in the corporate bond market, and Chernov et al.
(2013) show that CDS auctions can be biased. Among these theoretical contributions, our
paper is most closely related to Bolton and Oehmke (2011), as the channels through which
CDSs a↵ect firm value are very similar. While the other papers are important contributions
for our understanding of CDS markets, they do not provide models of the e↵ect of CDSs on
the interaction of equity holders and debt holders. In this sense, we focus on the corporate
finance aspect of credit derivatives. However, for a full welfare analysis, it would be necessary
to include other aspects of the CDS market as well.
Second, the literature on credit risk and strategic default. On the theoretical side, An-
derson and Sundaresan (1996), Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997), Mella-Barral (1999), Fan
and Sundaresan (2000), Hege and Mella-Barral (2005), and Acharya et al. (2006) examine
the e↵ect of strategic default on credit risk. Garlappi and Yan (2011) show that strategic
default plays a significant role in the distress puzzle. On the empirical side, Davydenko and
Strebulaev (2007) find that the risk of strategic default is reflected in credit spreads. Favara
et al. (2012) use a cross-country sample to show that strategic default risk a↵ects equity beta
and volatility. Our model di↵ers from the existing theories in several ways. First, we en-
dogenize the firm’s investment policy, whereas most authors assume an exogenous cash flow
process. Second, we expand the strategic interaction between equity holders and debt hold-
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ers. In the game at the beginning of each period, the equity holders choose their investment
and financing policies and strategically decide whether to repay the debt, to renegotiate the
debt, or to file for bankruptcy. The debt holders, on the other hand, strategically trade in
the CDS market in order to deter the firm from renegotiating the debt. In the second game,
played when debt is renegotiated, the two claim holders engage in Nash bargaining, which
determines the renegotiated debt level. Our analysis of this strategic interaction between the
equity holder and bondholders shows how CDS markets can mitigate the strategic default
problem identified in this literature.
1. Model and discussion
1.1. The model
We construct a partial equilibrium dynamic model with equity and debt financing, as well
as a CDS market. All agents in the model, the firm owner, the bondholders, and the CDS
dealer, are risk-neutral. The horizon is infinite and time is discrete. There is a firm with per-
period profit function ⇡(xz, k) = xzk↵   f , where ↵ 2]0, 1[ is the return-to-scale parameter,
f   0 is a fixed production cost, and k is the firm’s capital.
The firm’s profit shock, z, is a continuous-state Markov process with compact support
and with transition probability  (dz0|z). For definiteness, we assume that the evolution of
log z is an AR(1) process, log z0 = ⇢ log z +  "0, where " are i.i.d. draws from a truncated
standard normal distribution, and ⇢ 2]0, 1[ and   > 0 are parameters that are calibrated
later. As in Cooley and Quadrini (2001), the firm’s decisions are a↵ected by an independent
second shock, x, which takes non-negative values in a finite set {x0, x1, . . . , xN} and follows
a first order Markov process with transition probability  (x0|x), such that x0 = 0, and
 (x0|x0) = 1, which means that x0 is an absorbing state.
The firm’s capital depreciates at a rate   2]0, 1[, and the ex post book value of the asset
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is defined as
a = a(xz, k) = (1   )k + ⇡(xz, k). (1)
We denote as w the firm’s net worth:
w = w(xz, k, b) = a  b, (2)
where b is the face value of debt. The debt is an unsecured zero-coupon bond with a maturity
of one period. There is a possibility that the debt holders receive less than full face value at
maturity, so the debt is not risk-free.
There is a competitive market for insuring against credit risk, similarly to Bolton and
Oehmke (2011). In particular, debt holders can purchase a CDS from a dealer (protection
seller). The debt holders (protection buyers) choose a hedge ratio h, which is defined as the
fraction of the face value of debt b that is covered by the CDS contract. The dealer sets a fair
CDS spread, in the sense that the transaction has zero NPV. The protection seller, like all
agents in the model, has rational expectations: He understands that selling CDS protection to
the debt holders changes the probability of default, and adjusts the CDS spread accordingly.
Finally, the general model nests an important special case where there is no CDS market,
which can be obtained by setting h = 0 in every period.
There are several frictions in the economy. The main one is that the owner cannot commit
to debt repayment. In particular, she cannot write a contract that binds her not to default
on debt payments in the future. The firm can be liquidated, in which case a fraction ⇠ 2]0, 1[
of firm value is lost due to bankruptcy costs. If the debt is renegotiated in the future, which
is explained in more detail below, the renegotiation fails with an exogenous probability   2
]0, 1[. A failed renegotiation is followed by liquidation, which makes renegotiations costly in
expectation. Equity issuance is costly as well, and the parameter   measures the proportional
equity issuance costs. Finally, the discount factor of equity holders,  , is lower than the
discount factor of debt holders, 1/(1 + r). This makes equity financing more expensive than
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debt financing, which captures the tax advantages of debt and a debt-induced reduction in
managerial agency costs.
These frictions are the reason why CDS markets a↵ect firm value. Because of the lack
of commitment, the owner may renegotiate debt in the future by threatening to file for
bankruptcy if the debt holders do not accept a lower debt payment. This opportunistic
behavior is anticipated by the bondholders, who purchase CDS protection in order to improve
their bargaining position in a future renegotiation. At the point in time in which renegotiation
takes place, this is both costly and beneficial in terms of total firm value. On the one hand,
it reduces the owner’s incentive to renegotiate, which increases firm value because it avoids
a costly liquidation with probability  . On the other hand, it reduces firm value because
it increases the bargaining position of bondholders so much that the owner might prefer to
liquidate the firm. Also, at the point in time when the firm makes its payout, investment,
and financing decisions, CDSs can a↵ect firm value. This is because CDSs can reduce the
cost of debt financing, allowing the firm to rely less on expensive equity financing and to
invest more.
Every period, the following sequence of events takes place: First, the firm’s owner observes
(xt, zt, kt, bt, ht), and makes a default decision. This means choosing between repaying the
existing debt in full, renegotiating the debt, or liquidating the firm. At the next stage, the
owner makes a payout decision, which determines the dividend dt that is paid out. This is
followed by the investment and financing decision, where the owner selects the next period’s
capital level, kt+1, as well as the new face value of debt, bt+1. The bondholders observe the
new capital and debt levels, and choose their hedge ratio ht+1 accordingly. Since this whole
sequence of events takes place in the same period t, we only discount payo↵s once per period
instead of discounting at every stage. The sequence of events is summarized in Figure 1. We
follow this timeline and derive the optimal default, payout, investment and financing, and
hedging policies below.
In order to derive the owner’s optimal default decision, we denote V (x, z, w) as the cum-
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dividend equity value in the state (x, z, w). This is the payo↵ to the owner if debt is fully
repaid. If the owner decides to liquidate the firm, her payo↵ is max{(1   ⇠)a   b, 0}, which
is the liquidation value of the firm, net of the payment to debt holders, subject to a limited
liability constraint.
If the owner decides to renegotiate the debt, she enters into a Nash bargaining game with
the bondholders. The outcome of the bargaining game is a new debt value, br, which solves
the following optimization problem:
br(x, z, k, b, h) = argmax
p
[V (x, z, w(xz, k, p))]1 q ⇥ [p  hb  (1  h)(1  ⇠)a(xz, k)]q , (3)
with constraints
p  a(xz, k)  wd(xz), and p   hb+ (1  h)(1  ⇠)a(xz, k), (4)
where p denotes a payment from the owner to the bondholders, and wd(xz) is defined as the
unique zero of V (x, z, ·), i.e., the wd such that V (x, z, wd) = 0. The parameter q 2 [0, 1]
measures the bargaining power of the debt holders, and 1   q is the owner’s bargaining
power. The two constraints in (4) determine if the bargaining problem has a feasible solution.
Intuitively, the first constraint specifies that the payo↵ to the owner is at least her outside
option.4 Similarly, the second constraint makes sure that the bondholders’ payo↵ is at least
as large as their outside option. Their outside option can be decomposed into hb, the payo↵
they receive from the protection seller, (1  ⇠)a(xz, k), the liquidation value of the firm, and
 h(1 ⇠)a(xz, k), which is the payment to the protection seller. The outcome of a successful
renegotiation is a new debt level br = br(x, z, k, b, h), and the owner’s resulting payo↵ is
V (x, z, wr), where wr = w(xz, k, br) is the net worth ensuing from renegotiation.
4The first constraint derives from the assumption that the outcome of renegotiation is acceptable to the
owner if V (x, z, w(xz, k, p))   0, or equivalently V (x, z, w(xz, k, p))   V (x, z, wd(xz)) by definition of wd(xz).
Therefore, from w(xz, k, p)   wd(xz), using equation (2), we have a(xz, k)  p   wd(xz).
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We can now derive the optimal default policy, for a fixed (x, z, k, b, h). If x = x0, the firm
is immediately liquidated, and the payo↵s to the owner and to the bondholders are zero. The
interesting case is where x 6= x0 and b > 0. Figure 2 illustrates the owner’s optimal default
decision and the corresponding payo↵s in this case. Paying back the debt is optimal when
V (x, z, w) is su ciently high. However, there are states in which instead of repaying the
debt, the owner maximizes her value by renegotiating the debt or by liquidating the firm. If
the liquidation value of the firm’s assets is higher than the face value of debt, or (1  ⇠)a   b,
then the owner’s threat to liquidate is not credible, and therefore she will repay the debt. In
this case, the owner’s payo↵ is V = V (x, z, w).
In the case where the firm’s liquidation value is below the debt obligation, or (1 ⇠)a < b,
the renegotiation threat is credible, because debt holders can get a payo↵ lower than b if
renegotiation fails. From (4), renegotiation is not feasible if a(xz, k)   wd(xz) < hb + (1  
h)(1  ⇠)a(xz, k), or equivalently, if
h > H(x, z, k, b) =
⇠a  wd
⇠a  w , (5)
where H is positive because wd  0, w < ⇠a, and a(xz, k)   0 (assuming f = 0).5 It
is worthwhile mentioning that condition (5) is never satisfied in the model without a CDS
market, because h = 0 and H   0. Therefore, renegotiation is always feasible in the no-CDS
model.
When (5) is satisfied, the debt is repaid if V (x, z, w)   0, while the firm is liquidated if
V (x, z, w) < 0. The owner’s payo↵ is V = V (x, z, w) in the case of repayment and V = 0 in
5We provide the argument for wd(xz)  0 in Appendix B. Also, throughout the solution of the model,
we assume that f = 0, which implies a(xz, k)   0 for all (x, z, k). This is not a necessary assumption
for our results, but it greatly simplifies the analytical expressions. However, in the calibration of the model,
Section 2, we allow for a positive fixed cost f . After solving the model numerically, we check that a(xz, k) < 0
never occurs in the simulated data. Finally, w < ⇠a is the same as (1   ⇠)a < b, and the latter is true by
assumption.
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the case of liquidation.
In the case where debt renegotiation is feasible, i.e., if h  H, the owner prefers repay-
ment to renegotiation when V (x, z, w)   (1   )V (x, z, wr), where the term (1   ) accounts
for the fact that renegotiation can fail with probability  . If the inequality holds, she prefers
repayment and her payo↵ is V = V (x, z, w); otherwise, she prefers renegotiation with ex-
pected payo↵ V = (1  )V (x, z, wr). Finally, if (1  ⇠)a < b and b = 0, the firm is liquidated
if V is negative.
We summarize the owner’s default decision and her corresponding payo↵s in the following
equation:
V(x, z, k, b, h) =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
V (x, z, w) if (1  ⇠)a   b,
max {V (x, z, w), (1   )V (x, z, wr)} if (1  ⇠)a < b, b > 0, h  H,
max {V (x, z, w), 0} if (1  ⇠)a < b, b > 0, h > H,
or if (1  ⇠)a < b, b = 0.
(6)
In the next stage, following the timeline in Figure 1, the owner makes her payout deci-
sion. The owner’s optimal dividend payment, d, is the solution of the following optimization
problem:
V (x, z, w) = max
d
 
d+ + (1 +  )d  + v(x, z, w   d) , (7)
where d can have either sign; if it is negative, it is the amount of injected equity capital. In
this case, the firm incurs the transaction cost   per unit of equity capital. In (7), v(x, z, w d)
denotes the market value of the firm’s ex dividend equity, at the revised net worth, e = w d,
which is determined by the payout decision.
Given the revised net worth e, the owner makes an optimal decision for the next period
capital stock, k0, and debt, b0, from which v is determined:






V(x0, z0, k0, b0, h0) (dz0|z) (x0|x). (8)
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The owner takes into account that her decision a↵ects the bondholders’ hedge ratio. More
precisely, the optimal h0 is a function of k0 and b0, which we will derive when we get to the
hedging decision.
The owner’s decision is subject to the budget constraint
k0 = e+m(x, z, k0, b0), (9)
where m is the market value of debt, which we will derive below, as well as to the constraints
k0   0 and b0   0.
Following the owner’s investment and financing decision, the bondholders make their
hedging decision. In particular, they observe the current shocks x and z, as well as the
owner’s choices for k0 and b0, and choose h0. The bondholders take into account the owner’s
future default policy. In other words, they expect that in some future states (x0, z0, k0, b0, h0),
the debt will be repaid, and we indicate these states with the indicator function  0c. We
suppress the dependence of the indicator function on the state for brevity. Similarly,  0r
and  0` indicate states where the owner chooses to renegotiate the debt and to liquidate,
respectively.
Next, we derive the value of CDS contracts. The price of credit protection for a given h0,
to be paid at the end of the period, is the expectation of the net payment from the protection
seller:




[h0b0   h0(1  ⇠)a(x0z0, k0)] [  0r +  0`]  (dz0|z)  (x0|x), (10)
where  0r and  
0
` are the indicators for the states (x
0, z0, k0, b0, h0) in which the firm renegotiates
and liquidates, respectively. From the right-hand side of this expression, credit insurance only
covers the loss in case of the firm’s liquidation, whether this follows from failed renegotiation
or because renegotiation is made infeasible by a high hedge ratio, h0. This definition of the
CDS payo↵ corresponds to the Standard North American Corporate (SNAC) contract in the
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CDS market.
For arbitrary h0, the expected end-of-period payo↵ to debt holders for given capital k0
and face value b0 is




{b0  0c + br(x0, z0, k0, b0, h0) (1   ) 0r
+ [h0b0 + (1  h0)(1  ⇠)a(x0z0, k0)] [  0r +  0`]}  (dz0|z)  (x0|x). (11)
This includes both the payo↵ from the bond and the payo↵ from the protection seller. The
first term is the payment when debt is repaid, the second term is the payo↵ from successful
renegotiation, and the third term is the payo↵ when the firm is liquidated. The expected
payo↵ to bondholders, net of the cost of the CDS, is therefore
M(x, z, k0, b0, h0) = '(x, z, k0, b0, h0)  C(x, z, k0, b0, h0), (12)
and using the definition of C(x, z, k0, b0, h0), the expression can be simplified to




{b0  0c + br(x0, z0, k0, b0, h0) (1   ) 0r
+(1  ⇠)a(x0z0, k0) [  0r +  0`]}  (dz0|z)  (x0|x). (13)
The debt holders’ objective is to maximize the present value of their claim by choosing the
hedge ratio:




M(x, z, k0, b0, h0). (14)
The solution of the problem, h0 = h(x, z, k0, b0), is the state–contingent optimal hedge ratio
that is considered in the owner’s program in (8), and the market value of debt m(x, z, k0, b0)
enters into the budget constraint in (9).
This closes our discussion of the model. To solve it, one has to simultaneously solve the
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default decision in equation (6), the payout decision in (7), the investment and financing
decision in (8), subject to the budget constraint in (9), and the hedging decision in (14). In
the model without a CDS market, we set h = 0 in all periods. The algorithm to numerically
solve the model and to find all policies is described in Appendix A. We prove the existence
of a solution and certain properties of the value function in Appendix B.
1.2. Discussion of the e↵ects of a CDS market on firm value
The introduction of a CDS market has various e↵ects on firm value, and these e↵ects show up
at di↵erent stages of the model. We go through the di↵erent stages in inverse order relative
to the timeline in Figure 1: We start with the default decision at the beginning of period
t + 1, followed by the hedging decision at the end of period t, the investment and financing
decision in period t, and the payout decision in period t.
To highlight the costs and benefits of a CDS market at the default decision stage, we will
examine the di↵erence in firm value going from h = 0 to the optimal hedge ratio h = h⇤ in
the current period. We assume that h⇤   0, which we prove in Appendix B. While looking
at the increase from h = 0 to h = h⇤ in the current period, we hold the existing capital and
debt constant. Also, we hold the default policy and all other policies, d, k, b, and h, in all
future periods constant.
The first e↵ect of a higher hedge ratio is an increase in the likelihood of liquidation, and
a simultaneous decrease in the occurrence of renegotiation. Intuitively, this happens because
a higher hedge ratio increases the bondholders’ outside option in a renegotiation, which is
the minimum payment they demand. In states where the value of the firm is low, the owner
cannot justify such a high payment to the bondholders, which makes bargaining infeasible.
More formally, we know that renegotiation is only feasible if there is a payment p to the
bondholders that solves both inequalities in (4). The first inequality does not depend on
h. In the second inequality, however, the lower bound on p is increasing with h. So with a
higher h, the first inequality does not change, while the second inequality becomes tighter,
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which reduces the likelihood that both inequalities hold.
The second e↵ect of a higher hedge ratio is that it increases the likelihood of repay-
ment, while reducing the probability of renegotiation. In economic terms, this happens
because a higher hedge ratio increases the payment that needs to be made to bondhold-
ers in a renegotiation, which reduces the attractiveness of a renegotiation from the owner’s
perspective. More formally, we know that the owner prefers renegotiation to repayment if
(1    )V (x, z, wr)   V (x, z, w). A higher h decreases the chance that this inequality holds,
because it decreases the left-hand side. To see this, note that V is an increasing function
of wr, which we prove in Appendix B. Also, wr is decreasing in h, because wr is defined as
a(xz, k)  br, and br is increasing in h, which we show in Appendix B.
We can now understand how an increase from h = 0 to h = h⇤ a↵ects firm value.
The increase in the probability of liquidation reduces firm value, because liquidation creates
bankruptcy costs. The higher likelihood of repayment increases firm value, because it reduces
attempted renegotiation, and the latter would generate bankruptcy costs with probability  .
The positive e↵ect on firm value does not come from a change in the renegotiation payment
(br), because at this stage that is just a wealth transfer from equity holders to bondholders
and does not a↵ect firm value. However, we will see that the change in br matters at a
di↵erent stage.
It is worthwhile mentioning that it is not clear a priori whether the positive or the negative
e↵ect will dominate when we compare h = 0 to h = h⇤. The reason is that the bondholders
choose the hedge ratio, not the owner. If the owner were allowed to choose the hedge ratio,
the model would trivially predict that firm value with a CDS market is higher than without
a CDS market. Also, allowing for endogenous values of d, k, and b, we will see additional
e↵ects of CDSs on firm value. Once we calibrate the model in Section 2 and find the optimal
policies in all periods, we will be able to ask the question that we are ultimately interested
in: Do the positive or the negative e↵ects dominate if we go from a no-CDS world to a world
with CDS markets? And what is the quantitative e↵ect on firm value?
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We now move to the hedging decision stage. Again, we consider a change from h = 0 to
h = h⇤, keeping the default policy and all other policies, d, k, b, and h, in all future periods
constant. The market value of debt, m, at the optimal hedge ratio is at least as large as the
market value of debt at h = 0. This follows from the optimization problem in equation (14),
where we allow the bondholders to choose h = 0 if they want to. Therefore, they can never
be worse o↵ in a model with a CDS market than in a model without one. We will use this
insight to determine the e↵ect of CDS markets on firm value at the investment and financing
stage, as well as at the payout stage.
At the investment and financing stage, the positive e↵ect of a higher hedge ratio on the
renegotiation payment (br) is no longer value neutral, as it was at the default stage, because
equity has a lower discount factor than debt, or   < 1/(1 + r). Therefore, an increase in br
increases the value of debt more than it decreases the value of equity, in present value terms,
which increases firm value. Further, since the increase from h = 0 to h = h⇤ has a positive
e↵ect on the market value of debt (m), we know from the budget constraint in (9) that, for
given revised net worth (e) and debt (b0), a higher m leads to a higher level of capital (k0).
In other words, the firm can invest more, even without issuing new debt. This is what we
refer to as the real e↵ect of CDS markets.
Finally, at the payout stage, the introduction of a CDS market allows the firm to issue
less equity, while investing the same amount in capital and issuing the same amount of debt,
which saves equity issuance costs. To illustrate this point, for a given b0, the change from
h = 0 to h = h⇤ increases m in the budget constraint in (9), which allows the owner to keep
less equity e in the firm and still achieve the same k0. A lower e means a higher dividend d,
since e is defined as e = w   d. In states where d is negative, this implies the firm can issue
less equity, thus reducing the related flotation costs.
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2. Calibration
We calibrate the model with a CDS market so that it resembles the average public corporation
in the United States. We select the parameters such that the model is able to match the
investment and financing behavior of real firms. We start by constructing a sample from
the annual Compustat dataset for the 1994 – 2013 period. The sample period matches the
data availability of our other datasets. It also corresponds to the time period after the
introduction of a CDS market in the United States. We merge the Compustat sample with
CRSP data to calculate the market value of equity and to obtain the SIC code for each firm-
year observation. We remove financials (SIC codes between 6000–6999) and utilities (SIC
codes between 4900–4999), as well as firms for which the SIC code is missing. We also remove
observations where the CRSP share code is di↵erent from 10 or 11, in order to exclude other
securities than ordinary common shares of American companies.
For each firm-year observation, we determine whether the firm has filed for bankruptcy
in that year and add a bankruptcy dummy to the dataset. We use the same sample of
bankruptcies as in Chava and Jarrow (2004), Alanis et al. (2014), and Chava (2014).6 Since
some firms file for bankruptcy after they exit from the Compustat database, we also consider
bankruptcies that occur up to five years after a firm’s last observation in Compustat. For
these firms, we set the bankruptcy dummy equal to one in the year of the last observation
in Compustat.
Before we calculate the variables of interest, we set total assets (item 6) to missing if it is
negative. We then calculate the investment rate as the di↵erence between CAPX (item 30)
and the sale of PPE (item 107) divided by lagged gross PPE (item 7), as in Hennessy and
Whited (2007). Since the sale of PPE is missing for many firms, we set it to zero when it is not
available. Profitability is defined as operating profit (item 13) divided by lagged total assets.
The Q-ratio is the sum of the market value of equity from CRSP and liabilities (item 181)
divided by total assets. Book leverage is liabilities divided by total assets. Market leverage is
6We are grateful to Sudheer Chava for sharing this data with us.
17
liabilities divided by the sum of liabilities and the market value of equity. The payout ratio
is dividends (item 127) plus repurchases (item 115) minus stock issuance (item 108), divided
by lagged assets. The depreciation rate is depreciation and amortization (item 14) minus
amortization of intangibles (item 65), divided by lagged gross PPE. Since the amortization
of intangibles is missing for many firms, we set it to zero when it is not available. All these
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. We delete firm-year observations where
all seven variables of interest are missing.
To calculate equity issuance costs, we follow the methodology in Warusawitharana and
Whited (2016). The data are based on the SDC Platinum Global New Issuance database.
The dataset contains seasoned equity o↵erings (SEOs) in the U.S. between 1994 and 2013.
It excludes rights issues and unit issues. Firms are removed from the SDC sample if they are
not in the CRSP-Compustat sample, which leaves us with 6,636 equity o↵erings. We define
proportional equity issuance cost as total fees divided by total proceeds. The equity issuance
cost is also winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
Table 1 contains the summary statistics. We use this table as the basis for our calibration.
In other words, we choose the parameters of the model to match the averages in this table as
closely as possible. Since our model has a large number of parameters, we try to reduce the
dimensionality of the problem by assuming standard values from the literature for some of
our parameters, and calibrating the others. We choose the value of the risk-free interest rate
to be r = 0.05, which is similar to the values in Cooley and Quadrini (2001) (0.04), Moyen
(2004) (0.0526), and Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) (0.0526). The depreciation rate is set to
  = 0.1, similarly to Moyen (2004) (0.1) and Gomes (2001) (0.12). We choose the persistence
of productivity to be ⇢ = 0.75, which is comparable to Hennessy and Whited (2007) (0.68)
and DeAngelo et al. (2011) (0.728). We summarize all these parameter values in Table 2.
As in Cooley and Quadrini (2001), we assume that the variable x has two discrete values
and set x1 = 1. To determine the transition matrix for x, we set  (x0|x1) = 0.01. We can
interpret x as a rare but very large negative shock to the firm, which helps us to match the
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average credit spread in the data. If the shock hits the firm, the equity value is wiped out,
and the recovery rate of bondholders is zero. A less extreme real-world example would be
an unexpected asbestos lawsuit that destroys a large fraction of firm value. The role of the
shock x in the model is similar to the role of jumps in the jump-di↵usion literature in credit
risk (e.g., Lando, 2004).
We next calibrate the model by finding values for the parameters ( ,  ,↵, f, , ⇠,  , q) so
that the simulated firm behavior is close to the behavior of the average firm in our sample.
We try to match the following data moments in Table 1: average investment rate, average
operating profitability, average Q-ratio, average market leverage, average payout ratio, and
average bankruptcy rate. For any set of parameter values, we solve the dynamic program
using a discrete-state discrete-control version of the model and employing a value iteration
approach. Details of the procedure are in Appendix A.
We present the simulated moments from the model with CDSs in Table 3. For all the met-
rics except for liquidation frequency, the means are calculated by finding the cross-sectional
mean at a particular point in time, then taking the time series average of these cross-sectional
means in the economy. To calculate the liquidation rate, we divide the number of bankrupt-
cies in the simulated panel by the total number of observations.
We compare the data moments in Table 1 with the simulated moments in Table 3 to see
whether the model has explanatory power for actual firm behavior. Note that we use the
model with a CDS market for matching, since our sample period represents a time with a
CDS market in the U.S. Also, it is not a requirement of our calibration that all firms in the
economy have CDSs traded on their debt. The model with a CDS market allows bondholders
to buy or sell CDS protection, but bondholders sometimes endogenously choose not to trade
in the CDS market.
The empirical investment rate in Table 1 is 18.61%, while the simulated mean is 16%.
The simulated results are close to what we observe in the data. Operating profitability is
5.5% in the data and 18% in Table 3. While the firm in the model is more profitable than
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real firms, part of this is driven by negative outliers in the data. The median profitability
in Table 1 is substantially higher at 11.14%. The empirical Q-ratio is 2.14, which compares
to a simulated average of 1.8. Market leverage in the data is 0.338, while it is substantially
higher at 0.67 in the simulated sample. This is a well-known problem in the structural credit
risk literature. Most credit risk models produce a leverage ratio that is higher than what we
observe in the economy, which is sometimes called the low-leverage puzzle.
The empirical payout ratio is  4.46%, and its simulated counterpart is 2%. This discrep-
ancy can be explained by the findings in Fama and French (2001), who show that the average
payout ratio in Compustat is tilted downwards by the entrance of small, high-growth firms
that do not pay dividends or repurchase shares. They find that while total payouts by all
firms in Compustat have not decreased over time, the fraction of firms that pay dividends
has fallen dramatically. Therefore, one has to be careful when comparing the average in
Compustat, which is exposed to this kind of selection bias, with the mean of a steady-state
model like ours.
We are able to match the average credit spread very well. The predicted average spread
of 109.76 basis points is right between the 87 bps for A-rated bonds and the 149 bps for
Baa-rated bonds in Du↵ee (1998). Finally, the empirical average bankruptcy rate is 1.45%,
while it is slightly lower at 1.03% in the simulated sample. To summarize, our model is able
to match certain moments relatively well, while it is not able to match other moments very
closely.
Our calibrated parameter values in Table 2 are similar to the values reported in the litera-
ture. The value of   = 0.21 is higher than Gomes (2001) (0.15), but below the value in DeAn-
gelo et al. (2011) (0.28). This parameter directly impacts metrics such as EBITDA/assets
and leverage, and indirectly a↵ects default rates and credit spreads.
The calibrated proportional equity issuance cost of   = 5.63% is similar to the value
in Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) (5.38%) and indirect structural estimates in Hennessy and
Whited (2005) (5.9%). Also, it is very close to the average equity issuance cost of 5.36% in
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our sample, as reported in Table 1.
We find that the calibrated value for ↵ is 0.475, which is above the value in Moyen (2004)
(0.45) and below the value in Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) (0.592). The fixed production
cost of f = 1.14 is slightly higher than in Moyen (2004) (0.76). This parameter mainly a↵ects
the Q-ratio. Our value for  , the discount factor of equity holders, is 0.9434, which is slightly
lower than the value in Cooley and Quadrini (2001) (0.956).
The cost associated with liquidation (⇠) is calibrated to be 42% of the firm’s assets. This
value is substantially higher than traditional measures of bankruptcy costs, such as in Warner
(1977). However, more recently it has been found that estimates based on an ex post sample
of bankruptcies are biased downwards, because firms with high costs of financial distress will
choose lower leverage ratios and will default less frequently. Glover (2016) reports that after
correcting for this bias, bankruptcy costs for the average firm can be estimated to be 45%,
which is very close to our calibrated value.
Finally, we calibrate the probability of renegotiation failure   and the bargaining power
of bondholders q to be 0.63 and 0.35, respectively. It is di cult to find evidence of those
parameter values in the literature, since both parameters are unobservable empirically. Our
value for   essentially implies that there is a relatively large probability that debt renegoti-
ations fail. Gilson et al. (1990), Asquith et al. (1994), and Demiroglu and James (2015) all
find that roughly a half of the firms that attempt an out-of-court debt restructuring end up
in bankruptcy. This is consistent with our value of   = 0.63.
For the debt holders’ bargaining power, since empirical proxies are di cult to find, Morel-
lec et al. (2012) indirectly estimate the parameter using structural estimation, and report
that q = 0.57. Our value of 0.35 is smaller than that. However, their model is very di↵er-
ent from ours, as they assume exogenous cash flows and focus on agency conflicts between
management and shareholders. Our value is consistent with a view that equity holders have
more bargaining power than bondholders, which allows them to extract rents in a debt rene-
gotiation. This is consistent with the findings of Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007), who
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show that the risk of being exploited by equity holders is substantial enough to a↵ect credit
spreads. Similarly, Favara et al. (2012) show that this risk has an impact on equity betas.
3. Comparing the models with and without CDSs
3.1. The value e↵ect of CDSs
In Table 3, we compare the results of the calibrated model with CDSs to the model without
CDSs. These are unconditional results, using all simulated firm-year observations. Most
importantly, we find that the mean firm value in the economy with CDSs (16.08) is higher
than the corresponding average in the economy without CDSs (15.63). The exact relative
increase in firm value, or value e↵ect, is 2.92%. This magnitude is slightly less than half of
the e↵ect of optimal capital structure on firm value in Graham (2000), which is economically
plausible.
The sources of this value e↵ect are the same as in Section 1.2. The total value e↵ect is
a composition of negative and positive forces. On the one hand, CDSs destroy firm value
because they increase the probability of costly bankruptcy. Table 3 shows that the probability
of liquidation increases slightly from 1.01% to 1.03%. On the other hand, CDSs alleviate the
commitment problem between equity holders and bondholders. As bondholders are less
worried about debt renegotiation, the cost of debt financing goes down. This allows the firm
to invest more in physical capital. As reported in Table 3, average assets increase from 8.83
to 9.14. Also, since equity financing is more expensive than debt financing, the firm can use
more debt in its capital structure to further increase firm value. In our unconditional results,
average market leverage increases from 0.58 to 0.67. The strength of our model is its ability
to quantify the net e↵ect on firm value, which itself is a combination of these negative and
positive e↵ects.
The model is able to explain several findings in the empirical literature. First, the increase
in the probability of liquidation is consistent with Subrahmanyam et al. (2014), who show
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that firms are more likely to file for bankruptcy if CDS contracts are introduced on their
debt. Second, we find an increase in market leverage, which is consistent with the findings
of Saretto and Tookes (2013). Third, Ashcraft and Santos (2009) report that CDSs decrease
the cost of debt for high-quality borrowers, while increasing it for low-quality borrowers. The
authors find no significant e↵ect on the average firm. We find that for a fixed amount of
debt, introducing CDSs reduces the credit spread. However, allowing for endogenous debt
issuance increases the firm’s leverage so much that credit spreads increase. The two e↵ects
largely o↵set each other, consistent with the finding in Ashcraft and Santos (2009) for the
average firm.
To make sure that the result on the positive net e↵ect of CDSs on firm value does not
depend on our set of parameter values, we perform a sensitivity analysis in Table 4. We
present the average firm value in the model with CDSs as well as in the model without CDSs
using the base case parameter values in Table 2. We also present the results of the two models
using deviations from the base case parameter values. We change one parameter at a time,
and indicate the new value of the parameter that is changed. The table shows that for a
wide range of parameter values, the net e↵ect of CDSs on average firm value is positive. The
table also contains the results of a t-test, where we compare firm value in a no-CDS world to
firm value in a with-CDS world. The test results indicate that the net e↵ect on firm value
is statistically significant in all cases. These findings indicate that our results are robust and
do not depend on a particular set of parameter values.
Apart from robustness, Table 4 also provides some economic insights into the e↵ects of
CDS contracts. The first seven rows of Table 4 show how firm value changes with respect to
parameters q, ⇠, and  . Interestingly, in the model without CDSs, firm value changes sub-
stantially across these seven rows, but in the model with CDSs, firm value is almost constant.
Also, these are exactly the parameters of the model that gauge the commitment problem be-
tween equity holders and bondholders the most. What we can learn from this observation is
that the introduction of CDSs allows bondholders to protect themselves against exploitation
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by equity holders. Most changes in the risk of exploitation caused by the parameters q, ⇠,
or   can be hedged using CDSs. This ultimately benefits not just the bondholders, but also
the equity holders.
Another way to see the value e↵ect is to compare a firm in the with-CDS economy to a
firm in the no-CDS world, both starting at the same point in the state space (z, k, b). This is
what we do in Figure 3. It shows the firm at a specific point in the state space, where capital
is k = 11.12 and the face value of debt is b = 13.12. The points are chosen to be relatively
close to the average values of capital and debt in Table 3. To choose the value of the hedge
ratio h, we first use the policy functions of the model to find all the points in the state space
for h that are consistent with the chosen values for k and b. We then pick the maximum of
these values, which is h = 0.97.7 For the no-CDS firm we set h = 0.
The x-axis in Figure 3 represents di↵erent values of current productivity z. Circles show
a firm without CDSs, while diamonds represent a firm in the economy with CDS markets.
Solid circles/diamonds indicate that the firm optimally renegotiates its debt at this point,
before choosing the optimal k0 and b0. We will focus on the empty circles/diamonds first,
because they represent a healthy firm that is not currently in default.
We see that firm value increases with the introduction of CDSs. This value e↵ect is
especially pronounced for intermediate values of z. There is also a small but positive value
e↵ect for high values of z, but it is not easy to see due to the scale of the plot. We will
illustrate the e↵ect for high values of z later on. The figure also shows that equity value
is lower, compared to the model without CDSs, and the book value of debt is higher in all
states, which results in higher leverage with CDSs. All of these observations are consistent
with our unconditional results in Table 3.
If we look at the solid circles and diamonds in Figure 3, which correspond to very low
values of the productivity shock, we see that it is possible for the value e↵ect to be negative.
7In unreported results, we also draw the figure using the minimum value of h that is consistent with k
and b, and the plots look qualitatively very similar.
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These are the states when the firm is in default. The intuition for a negative value e↵ect
is that the firm without CDSs can renegotiate in a way that is more favorable for equity
holders. As a result, firms in the no-CDS economy emerge from renegotiation with more
equity, which more than outweighs the disadvantage of not having a CDS market.
We have shown that for a healthy firm that is currently not in default, the e↵ect of CDSs
on firm value is positive. However, Figure 3 only shows the firm at one point in the state
space. It is not clear whether the e↵ect on firm value is positive at other points (k, b) as well.
Therefore, we examine other points in the state space. In Figure 4, for example, we choose
k = 6.57 and b = 0, which represents a small firm with no debt (and hence also h = 0). Most
interestingly, the value e↵ect is never negative. Due to the scale of the plot for firm value, it
might seem that the value e↵ect is zero, when it is in fact positive. To get around the scale
problem, Figure 5 presents the di↵erence between firm value in the with-CDS economy and
firm value in the no-CDS economy, at the same point k = 6.57 and b = 0. It shows that the
value e↵ect is positive at all values of z. Also, while it seemed in Figure 3 that the value
e↵ect is zero for high values of z, Figure 5 shows that this is not true: The value e↵ect is
positive even for very high values of z.
Figures 6 and 7 are analogous to Figures 3 and 4, but with di↵erent values of (k, b).
Figure 6 depicts a large firm with no debt, while Figure 7 illustrates a small firm with high
debt. In both figures, the e↵ect of CDSs on firm value is positive for firms that are not in
default, which suggests that our conclusion is robust. Also, it is interesting to observe that
the large firm with no debt (Figure 6) behaves very similarly to the small firm with no debt
(Figure 4). Likewise, the small firm with high debt (Figure 7) is very similar to the large
firm with high debt (Figure 3). Together these observations suggest that leverage is a more
important determinant of outcomes than firm size. Also, the value e↵ect is larger for firms
with high leverage compared to low-leverage firms.
25
3.2. The real e↵ect of CDSs
The positive net e↵ect on firm value in Table 3 is to a substantial part driven by the ability
of firms in the with-CDS economy to accumulate capital to an amount that is closer to
the frictionless first-best capital level. It is in this sense that CDSs have a real e↵ect on
firms. We document this real e↵ect in several di↵erent ways. First, as shown in Table 3,
the unconditional mean of capital is higher in the economy with CDSs, at 9.14, compared
to the economy without CDS markets, at 8.83. This di↵erence translates to an economically
significant relative increase in capital of 3.5%.
The second way to see the real e↵ect is to compare a firm in the with-CDS economy to a
firm in the no-CDS world, both starting at the same point in the state space (z, k, b), and to
check if there is a di↵erence in the chosen capital level k0. This is what we do in Figures 3, 4,
6, and 7. Consistent with the real e↵ect documented in Table 3, the firm with CDSs chooses
a higher level of capital in all four figures. Interestingly, the magnitude of the real e↵ect is
not the same for every value of z. If the productivity shock z is very high, CDSs have a very
small e↵ect on capital. Finally, Figures 3, 4, 6, and 7 show that the real e↵ect is larger for
firms with high leverage, which is analogous to our findings for the value e↵ect.
We have shown that CDSs have an e↵ect on the unconditional mean of capital, as well
as on the optimal capital k0 starting from a given point (z, k, b). The third way to see that
there is a real e↵ect is to check if the steady state of capital is indeed higher in a world with
CDSs. In Figure 8, we examine the evolution of capital and its convergence to the steady
state. Figure 8 (a) shows how firms evolve after their entry into the economy. The solid red
line shows the average over all simulated paths in the with-CDS economy, while the dotted
blue line shows the average path in the no-CDS economy. As the figure shows, both firms
reach the steady state after approximately eight periods. Most importantly, the with-CDS
firm converges to a higher steady-state value of capital than the no-CDS firm.
Even though Figure 8 (a) shows that CDSs increase the steady-state value of capital, the
two firms start at a di↵erent initial value of capital. This di↵erence in the initial capital
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arises endogenously in the model, and is also a positive e↵ect of CDSs. However, it might
create the wrong impression that the higher steady state value is driven by the higher starting
value of capital. To rule out this explanation, we condition the simulated firms on the same
initial capital, and follow them through time. The solid red line in Figure 8 (b) presents the
average path for the with-CDS firm, while the dotted blue line shows the average path for
the no-CDS firm. As before, in an economy with CDS markets, capital converges to a higher
steady-state value. This suggests that the di↵erence in steady states is not driven by the
di↵erence in initial values of capital.
We conclude by observing that the addition of a CDS market has a real e↵ect on firms.
The reduction in the cost of debt financing allows firms to invest more in capital. The result
is a higher steady state of capital in the with-CDS economy. This is beneficial because in an
economy with financial frictions, capital is usually below its first-best value. The introduction
of a CDS market allows the firm to move closer to the first-best value of capital.
3.3. The e↵ect of CDSs on di↵erent types of firms
In Tables 5 and 6, we look at the e↵ect of CDSs on small firms and large firms, respectively.
We perform a 4 ⇥ 3 double sort on all simulated firm/year observations in the no-CDS
economy, where the sorting variables are k and z, respectively. Small firms are defined as the
intersection of observations in the second quartile group for k and those in the intermediate
tercile group for z, while large firms are the intersection of the third quartile for k and the
intermediate tercile group for z. We perform the same sorting in the with-CDS economy.
The two tables show the value e↵ect of CDSs is 4.00% for small firms, but only 2.67% for
large firms. In other words, small firms benefit more from the introduction of CDS markets
than large firms, although the value e↵ect is positive for both types of firms. A caveat of
comparing firms in di↵erent bins like in Tables 5 and 6 is that one cannot simply compare the
mean of assets in both the economies to infer the size of the real e↵ect of CDSs. The reason
is that average assets in these tables represent conditional means at a given point in time in
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the firm’s life, so they only reflect the average capital at the time the bins are formed. Unlike
the unconditional mean of capital, they do not say anything about what level of capital the
average firm will achieve in the future.
Another prediction of our model is that the value e↵ect of CDSs is larger for firms with
financial constraints. We argue that in the context of our model, the exogenous equity
issuance cost   is the best measure for financial constraints. If   is high, it is more expensive
for the firm to obtain outside equity financing, other things being equal. Table 4 shows
that   = 0.05 is associated with a value e↵ect of 3.02%, and that   = 0.06 leads to a value
e↵ect of 3.55%. Therefore, firms that are more financially constrained benefit more from the
introduction of CDS markets.
As an alternative measure for financial constraints, we rank firm-year observations by
their payout ratio and argue that a low payout ratio is a sign of financial constraints. A low
payout ratio has been used as a measure of financial constraints in the empirical literature
[Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016) provide a recent review]. The advantage of this measure
is that it is varying over time, and that it not only measures the cost of equity issuance. The
disadvantage is that it is not an exogenous parameter such as  . Tables 7 and 8 provide
summary statistics for firms with low and high equity payout ratios, respectively. In the
no-CDS economy, we define low payout firm-year observations in the bottom tercile group of
the distribution of payout ratios. High payout firms are defined as observations in the top
tercile group. We repeat this sorting for the with-CDS economy. The two tables show that
for firms with a low payout ratio the value e↵ect is 4.24%, while with a high payout ratio
the value e↵ect is slightly negative at  1.22%. While these results can be interpreted in a
way that the value e↵ect is smaller for unconstrained firms, one has to keep the limitations
of our methodology in mind when looking at the negative e↵ect of  1.22%. What seems to
be a negative value e↵ect is a consequence of an inherent limitation of our sorting procedure.
Sorting firms into buckets in Table 8 selects slightly higher capital firms in the no-CDS
economy compared to the with-CDS economy. The di↵erence in capital levels biases the
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value e↵ect downwards. To conclude, the results in Tables 7 and 8 are consistent with the
observations in Table 4, and suggest that financially constrained firms benefit more from the
introduction of CDS markets.
In Tables 9 and 10 we compare low and high productivity firms, respectively. We perform
a 3 ⇥ 4 double sort on k and z, and classify observations in the intermediate bin for k and
in the second bin for z as low productivity firms. Analogously, high productivity firms are
defined as the intermediate bin for k and the third bin for z. Tables 9 and 10 show that
the value e↵ect for firms with low productivity shocks is 7.00%, while for high productivity
firms it is 2.03%. In other words, low productivity firms benefit more from the introduction
of CDS markets. The intuition for this result is that low productivity firms are more likely
to be financially constrained, since the productivity level z also a↵ects the current operating
cash flow ⇡(xz, k). Therefore, these firms benefit more from the reduction in the cost of
debt financing caused by CDS contracts. This is consistent with the results on financial
constraints in Tables 4, 7, and 8.
We conclude this analysis of di↵erent firm types by observing that while the CDS market
on average has a positive net e↵ect on firm value, it is especially beneficial for small firms,
financially constrained firms, and low productivity firms.
4. Empirical tests
Our model can be used to derive several new predictions for the hedge ratio. In this section
we perform empirical tests for a few of these predictions. The model predicts that the hedge
ratio h0(z, k0, b0) will vary across firms and across time, depending on the current state of
the firm. Since the state of the firm is not directly observable, but firm characteristics are,
we can in principle test the relationship between the hedge ratio and firm characteristics.
While this is not a detailed empirical analysis, it demonstrates how the model can be used to
understand certain aspects of the amount outstanding in the CDS market. Also, the results
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can be seen as an indirect empirical validation of the model.
Based on the model, we can derive the following three simple testable predictions. First,
we expect a positive relationship between lagged market leverage and the hedge ratio. The
intuition is that higher leverage increases the probability of renegotiation in the next period.
Bondholders want to protect themselves against expropriation by equity holders, which in-
creases the hedge ratio. Second, we expect a negative relationship between lagged Q and
the hedge ratio. Intuitively, a higher Q–ratio signals that the firm has experienced a high
productivity shock. This reduces the probability of renegotiation in the next period, which
then reduces the need for hedging. Table 11 formalizes these predictions in a simulated re-
gression framework. It contains the results of regressions using simulated data that is created
using the numerical procedure in Appendix A, and confirms that market leverage is positively
correlated with the hedge ratio, while the Q–ratio has a negative coe cient.
Third, we expect a positive relationship between non-fixed assets, defined as 1 minus
the fraction of fixed assets, and the hedge ratio. Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) argue
that this is a good proxy for liquidation costs, which corresponds to the parameter ⇠ in
our model. The intuition is that in debt renegotiation, a higher value of ⇠ improves the
bargaining position of equity holders, because it reduces the outside option of debt holders,
since the liquidation value of the firm is lower. More formally, in the second inequality in
(4), the right-hand side is decreasing in ⇠. Therefore, bondholders are especially vulnerable
to expropriation if ⇠ is high, so they choose a higher hedge ratio to protect themselves. This
prediction of the model is confirmed in a simpler setup by Danis and Gamba (2016). We also
check numerically that ⇠ increases the average hedge ratio in the dynamic model, but omit
a separate table for brevity.
The hedge ratio of real-world bondholders is not observable, because there is no available
database on the identity of CDS investors. Therefore, we construct our own proxy for the
hedge ratio, using data published by the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC).
In October 2008, the DTCC started reporting the total amount of CDSs outstanding for the
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global top 1,000 reference entities every week. We download this data from the time it became
available to the end of 2013, which corresponds to the end of the sample period for our main
Compustat/CRSP sample. We clean the data by removing sovereign reference entities and
municipalities, and reference entities outside of the Americas region. We then manually match
each firm in the remaining DTCC sample to a GVKEY based on firm name, only keeping
U.S. reference entities. The result is a sample of 456 U.S. corporate reference entities which
can be linked to firms in Compustat/CRSP. Matching this sample with Compustat/CRSP
yields an unbalanced panel of 2,069 firm-year observations.
We define our proxy for the aggregate hedge ratio of bondholders, NetNotional/Debt, as
the net notional amount of CDSs outstanding for firm i in year t, divided by the sum of debt
in current liabilities and long-term debt. We focus on the net notional amount because this
way a short CDS position of an investor, created to close a previously created long position
in the same CDS reference, will not inflate the total amount of CDSs outstanding. The
gross notional amount, however, would be biased upwards because of these o↵setting trades.
Oehmke and Zawadowski (2016) explain in more detail why the net notional amount is a
better measure for the amount outstanding. If the denominator of NetNotional/Debt is zero,
we drop the observation from the sample.
We calculate several variables before testing our three predictions. We define Market
leverage as total liabilities divided by the sum of total liabilities and the market value of
equity. Q–Ratio is defined as the sum of market equity, debt in current liabilities, and
long-term debt, divided by total assets. We define Non-fixed assets as 1 - (net PPE / total
assets), as in Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007). Finally, Size is calculated as the log of total
assets. All variables are lagged by one year, except NetNotional/Debt. Also, the variables
are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels, except Market leverage and Non-fixed assets. Since
these two variables should be bounded by the unit interval, we truncate them at zero and
one. We only keep observations in the sample for which all variables (NetNotional/Debt,
Market leverage, Q–Ratio, Non-fixed assets, and Size) are available. This results in a final
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sample of 1,481 firm-year observations.
Table 12 contains summary statistics for the DTCC sample. The mean of NetNo-
tional/Debt is 0.28, so the amount of CDSs outstanding is a bit less than a third of the
debt outstanding for the average firm. The variable ranges from 0.0083 to 2.65, which means
that for some firms there are more CDSs than bonds outstanding. There are several reasons
for this. The most obvious one is that empirically many CDSs are purchased for speculative
purposes rather than for hedging an existing bond position, as shown in Oehmke and Zawad-
owski (2016). The other summary statistics are informative in the sense that they reveal that
firms in the DTCC sample are a bit di↵erent from the average firm in Compustat/CRSP.
Compared to Table 1, DTCC firms have higher leverage and lower Q–ratios. This is broadly
consistent with other studies of firms with CDSs, such as Subrahmanyam et al. (2014), who
also show that CDS entities are larger than the average firm.
Table 13 presents the results of simple linear regressions testing these predictions. All
regressions include Size as a control variable. Most importantly, the coe cients of Market
leverage, Q–Ratio, and Non-fixed assets have the same signs as predicted by the model. Also,
they are statistically significant at the 1% level in all three cases. While these tests are very
simplistic, they suggest that our model is able to explain some of the real-world variation in
hedge ratios.
5. Conclusions
We examine the e↵ect of CDSs on firm value in the context of a dynamic model where
the firm chooses default, investment, equity financing, and debt financing in an optimal
manner each period. The model features several real-world frictions: limited commitment by
equity holders, equity issuance costs, bankruptcy costs, and debt renegotiation frictions. We
construct two versions of the model, with and without a CDS market. In the version with
CDSs, debt holders are able to trade in the CDS market and choose their positions optimally
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each period.
After calibrating this model to the average public corporation in the U.S., we examine
the e↵ect of introducing a CDS market in the economy. Our main result is that while CDS
contracts have both positive and negative e↵ects on firm value, the net e↵ect is positive.
For public U.S. corporations, our calibration suggests an increase in firm value of 2.9% on
average.
The model predicts that after the introduction of a CDS market, firm leverage increases,
the firm invests in more physical capital, the probability of bankruptcy increases, and credit
spreads do not change significantly. These findings are consistent with the existing empirical
literature on the e↵ects of CDS contracts. Moreover, while the empirical literature has
focused on specific aspects of the introduction of CDSs on corporate finance, we provide a
unifying theory of the firm that can explain these facts altogether. In addition, we derive the
following new predictions from the model. The e↵ect on firm value is the strongest for small
firms, for companies with financial constraints, and for low-productivity firms.
Our model is simplistic in the sense that it only examines the e↵ect of CDS markets from
a corporate finance perspective. We neglect other potentially important e↵ects of credit
derivatives, such as on risk sharing, liquidity, and banking. Keeping these caveats in mind,
our results show that CDSs are useful for the average firm in the U.S. In light of the recent
financial crisis and the following policy discussion, the findings are consistent with a view
that while CDS contracts can cause problems, their benefits likely outweigh their costs.
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Appendix A. Numerical procedure
The algorithm to solve the dynamic program of the firm is based on value function iteration
on a discretized state space. We will focus on the procedure to solve the problem with CDS,
as the algorithm for the non-CDS case is nested into it. The description follows below.
1. Choose grid for z and approximate   with a discrete-state Markov chain with Nz points
using the Tauchen (1986) method. As in Cooley and Quadrini (2001), choose grid {0, 1}
for x and transition probability such that  (x0|x1) = 0.01 and  (x0|x0) = 1. Choose
grid for k:  
kj = k(1   )Nk j, j = 1, . . . , Nk
 
.
Choose grid for b, dividing [0, b] in Nb equal intervals. Choose the grid for h by dividing
[0, 1] in Nh equal intervals. k and b are selected so that they are not binding.
2. Compute net worth w on the grid of points (x, z, k, b) using the identity
w = (1   )k   ⇡(xz, k)  b.
3. Start with guesses for v(x, z, w) and m(x, z, k, b).
4. For each (x, z, k0, b0), compute the values for the potential levels of revised net worth,
e = e(x, z, k0, b0) = k0   m(x, z, k0, b0). From these, calculate the possible dividends:
d = d(x, z, k0, b0) = w   e.
5. At each (x, z, w), find V (x, z, w) and the optimal d⇤ solving the program (7):
V (x, z, w) = max
d
 
d+ + (1 +  )d  + v(x, z, w   d) .
6. For each (x, z), use linear interpolation to determine wd(xz) as the zero of function
V (x, z, ·) calculated in Step 5.
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7. At each (x, z, w),
• calculate H(x, z, w);
• if (1  ⇠)a < b, for each h calculate
br = (1  q) [hb+ (1  h)(1  ⇠)a(xz, k)] + q [a(xz, k)  wd(xz)] . (15)
Then, determine V (x, z, wr) using linear interpolation on V from Step 5, where
wr = a(xz, k)  br;
• for each h, find the payo↵ to equity V using equation (6) and determine the
corresponding payo↵ to debt.
8. For each (x, z, e), where e is determined in Step 4, update v using






V(x0, z0, k0, b0, h0) (dz0|z) (x0|x)
and update m using equation




M(x, z, k0, b0, h0)
with M defined in equation (13). Given the solutions of the equity and debt programs,
we update also the optimal state-dependent policy for equity (k⇤, b⇤), and for debt h⇤,
respectively.
9. Repeat Steps from 4 to 8 until convergence of the functions v and m.
Regarding the above procedure, there are several comments in order. The function
V (x, z, ·) is strictly increasing in w, which we show in Appendix B. Therefore, wd(xz) in
Step 6 is uniquely defined.
In the bargaining game, br cannot be found analytically solving the problem in (3),
because V is determined numerically in the iterative algorithm described above. However, br
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can be approximated as in equation (15) in Step 7. The argument relies on the assumption
that the function V is continuously di↵erentiable, except at the point in which d = 0, which
we show in Appendix B. States in which the renegotiation threat is credible are such that
d < 0, as the firm is near the liquidation threshold. Therefore, V is continuously di↵erentiable
in these states. If we knew V , we could exactly calculate br = br(x, z, k, b) by solving the
first-order condition of problem (3):




+ qV (x, z, wr) = 0, (16)
where wr = a(xz, k)   br. A convenient approximation of the solution br of (16) can be
obtained by observing that if V is a continuously di↵erentiable function at w1, then





if w2 is su ciently near to w1. Considering w1 = wr and w2 = wd(xz), then V (w2) = 0 by
definition, and we can put (17) in place of the second addend in (16), obtaining








Because V is strictly increasing in w, then the partial derivative is strictly positive and we
can simplify the above equation and solve it for br, obtaining
br ⇡ (1  q) [hb+ (1  h)(1  ⇠)a(xz, k)] + q [a(xz, k)  wd(xz)] ,
which does not depend directly on V .
The numerical procedure is implemented by discretizing the exogenous variable log z in
the range of ± 3 times the unconditional standard deviation of the AR(1) process with
36
Nz = 11 points. We also discretize the interval [0, k] for k and the interval [0, b] for b with
65 points each, and the interval [0, 1] for h with 61 points. The bounds for capital stock and
debt are k = 60 and b = 60, respectively. The numerical solution of the Bellman problem
gives us the optimal policies and the optimal security values. Using a Monte Carlo method,
we then simulate an economy comprising 200 firms at their steady state for 1000 years, for a
total of 200,000 firm-year observations.
When simulating the economy, to keep the model stationary, we assume that if a firm
is liquidated or when x = x0, it is replaced by a new firm, which is started at the value
V (x, z, wd(xz)) = 0, and therefore it immediately makes an optimal investment and financing
decision based on e = wd(xz), with x 6= x0, as per the program in (8).
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Appendix B. Properties of the solution of the model
B.1. The firm’s problem
We summarize in this appendix the model with CDSs, as described in the paper. The problem
without CDSs is nested into it, and can be obtained by setting the hedge ratio, h, to zero. For
brevity, we report the problem with only the shock z (that is, x is constant). The extension
to the case in which also x is stochastic is straightforward and similar to what is done by
Cooley and Quadrini (2001). Therefore, we do not report it.
The firm’s problem can be stated as





V (z0, ew(z0, k0, b0, h0)) (dz0|z) 
s.t. e = k0  m(z, k0, b0)
(18)
with
ew(z, k, b, h) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
wd(zd) + (z   zd)k↵ if z > zr
wd(zd) + (z   zd)k↵ + (b  br) if zd < z  zr
wd(zd) if z  zd
, if h  H(z, k, b),
ew(z, k, b, h) =
8>><>>:
wd(zd) + (z   zd)k↵ if z   zd
wd(zd) if z  zd
, if h > H(z, k, b).
(19)
Denoting a(z, k) = (1   )k + (zk↵   f),
H(z, k, b) =
⇠a(z, k)  wd(z)
b  (1  ⇠)a(z, k) (20)
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zd(k, b) : wd(zd) = a(zd, k)  b (21)
if h  H(z, k, b), zr(k, b) : wr(zr) = a(zr, k)  b (22)
wd(z) : V (z, wd(z)) = 0 (23)
if h  H(z, k, b), wr(z) : V (z, wr(z)) = (1   )V (z, a(z, k)  br). (24)
If h  H(z, k, b) and assuming q 2]0, 1[, the bargaining problem is
br(z, k, b, h) = argmax
p
 
[V (z, a(z, k)  p)]1 q ⇥ [p  hb  (1  h)(1  ⇠)a(z, k)]q ,
s.t. p 2 [hb+ (1  h)(1  ⇠)a(z, k), a(z, k)  wd(z)] .
(25)
The debt holder’s problem is





Z em(z0, k, b, h0) (dz0|z)  (26)
with
em(z, k, b, h0) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
b if z > zr
(1   )br(z, k, b, h0) +  (1  ⇠)a(z, k) if zd < z  zr
(1  ⇠)a(z, k) if z  zd
, if h0  H(z, k, b),
em(z, k, b, h0) =
8>><>>:
b if z > zd
(1  ⇠)a(z, k) if z  zd
, if h0 > H(z, k, b),
To close the firm’s problem and the model:
V (z, w) = max
e
 
(w   e)+ + (1 +  )(w   e)  + v(z, e) . (27)
The above description of the model can be reconciled with the one in the main text.
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Conditions in (19) can be derived from equation (6) as follows:8 if h  H
8>><>>:
V (z, w) if w   ⇠a
max {0, V (z, w), (1   )V (z, a  br)} if w < ⇠a
=
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
V (z, w) if w > wr
(1   )V (z, a  br) if wd < w  wr
0 if w  wd
where wd is defined from (23) and wr from (24). On the other hand, if h > H then8>><>>:
V (z, w) if w   ⇠a
max {V (z, w), 0} if w < ⇠a
=
8>><>>:
V (z, w) if w > wd
0 if w  wd
.
Because a(z, k) is monotonic in z, we derive from equations (21) and (22) the unique values
of zd and zr, respectively. This allows us to re-write the owner’s payo↵ V (z, ew(z, k, b, h)) as
follows. For h  H
ew(z, k, b, h) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
a(z, k)  b if z > zr
a(z, k)  br if zd < z  zr
wd(zd) if z  zd
and, using the definition of zd in (21), we have the first equation in (19). Similarly, in the
case h > H,
ew(z, k, b, h) =
8>><>>:
a(z, k)  b if z > zd
wd(zd) if z  zd
from which we find the second equation in (19).
B.2. Existence of the solution of the firm’s problem
Following Cooley and Quadrini (2001), we can restrict e 2 [emin, emax]. This is because there
is a lower bound emin below which equity is issued and an upper bound emax above which
8We assume for definiteness b > 0, which is the case prevailing in equilibrium.
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equity is paid out to shareholders. Similarly, there is an upper bound k such that k > k
would not be economically profitable and would never be chosen in equilibrium. Finally, also
b is bounded above, because k   e is bounded above, and m is a non-decreasing function of
b. We can omit any consideration of b > b, where m(z, k, b) is the maximum value of debt at
z. In what follows we assume also that the support of z is compact: z 2 [z, z].
We will show later that m(z, k, b) is continuous. Therefore, because the domains of e, k,
and b are bounded, continuity of m w.r.t. (k, b), is su cient (see Exercise 3.13 in Stokey and
Lucas (1989)) for the correspondence
B(z, e) =
 
(k, b) : k 2 [0, k], b 2 [0, b], e = k  m(z, k, b) 
that defines the feasible set for problem (18) to be continuous, compact, and convex valued.
Because in problem (27) the payo↵ is continuous and strictly increasing in w, V is strictly
increasing in w. This property of V allows us to uniquely define wd(z) from (23). Similarly,
from the properties of V we uniquely define wr(z) from (24). Using the same argument as
in Proposition 5 of Hennessy and Whited (2007), wd(z) is negative valued, continuous, and
non-increasing, and wr(z) is continuous. Using the same argument as in Proposition 6 in
Hennessy and Whited (2007), zd and zr are continuous functions.
Defining from (18) the Bellman operator





V (z0, ew(z0, k0, b0, h0)) (dz0|z)  ,
T maps continuous and bounded functions into themselves. This is because if v is continuous
and bounded, then also V is continuous and bounded, and, as in Cooley and Quadrini
(2001), the boundedness and continuity of
R ew(z0, k, b, h) (dz0|z) and V imply, together with
the Feller property of  , that the objective function (18) is continuous and bounded. Because
the correspondence B is continuous, compact, and convex valued, the maximum exists and
v is continuous (see Theorem 3.6 in Stokey and Lucas (1989)). The resulting function Tv is
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unique because the operator T is a contraction mapping, as can be proved showing that it
satisfies Blackwell’s su cient conditions, using the same argument as on p. 1739 in Hennessy
and Whited (2007).
Because V is continuous, then the objective function of problem (25) is continuous in
p. The feasible set of the same problem, [hb+ (1  h)(1  ⇠)a(z, k), a(z, k)  wd(z)], is non-
empty if h  H(z, k, b), and is a continuous correspondence, because (see Exercise 3.13 in
Stokey and Lucas (1989)) a(z, k) and wd(z) are continuous, as we have proved above. The
feasible set is also compact and convex valued. Therefore, the problem (25) has a solution.
As we will prove later, v is strictly concave, and so is V as defined in (27). Therefore, because
we assume q 2]0, 1[, the objective function in (25) is strictly concave in p and the optimal
solution, br(z, k, b, h), is uniquely defined and continuous. We can show that br(z, k, b, h) is
increasing in both z and h. To see this, we first write the solution of the bargaining game in
(25) as
br = (1  q) [hb+ (1  h)(1  ⇠)a(z, k)] + qV (z, a(z, k)  br).
This equation implicitly defines br. As we will show later, V is di↵erentiable, except at the
point in which the dividend is zero. Using the implicit function theorem, we calculate the




(1  q)(1  h)(1  ⇠) + q @V@w






(1  q) [b  (1  ⇠)a(z, k)]
1 + q @V@w
  0,
and in both cases we rely on the fact that @V/@w > 0, as shown before.
Because wd is continuous and decreasing, and because renegotiation is a credible threat
only when b > (1   ⇠)a(k, z), H(z, k, b) in equation (20) is positive valued, continuous, and
increasing in z.
As for the debt holder’s problem in (26), because the support of z0 is bounded in [z, z]
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a(z0, k) (dz0|z) + b[1   (zd|z)]
 
.
Hence, H(z, k, b) is a natural upper bound for h0 in problem (26).
We now show that there is also a natural lower bound for h0, which is h0   0. Assume
h0 < 0, then the outcome of the owner’s default decision reduces to either renegotiation
or repayment. The reason why liquidation will not happen is that renegotiation is always
feasible, since H > 0, so h0 < H is always true, and because the owner prefers renegotiation
to liquidation. One can also show that if h0 < 0, an increase in h0 leads to an increase in
the expected payo↵ to bondholders. The reason is that repayment becomes more likely than
renegotiation if h0 increases. To see this, remember that the owner will choose repayment
over renegotiation if V (z, w) > (1    )V (z, a   br). A higher h0 increases br, which reduces
a   br, which reduces V (z, a   br), since V is an increasing function. Therefore, a higher h0
increases the expected payo↵ to bondholders, so h0 < 0 cannot be optimal.
The boundedness and continuity of
R em(z0, k, b, h) (dz0|z), and the fact that the feasible
set is a continuous, compact and convex valued correspondence ensure that a solution to
problem (26) exists and that m(z, k, b) is continuous (see Theorem 3.6 in Stokey and Lucas
(1989)).
B.3. Monotonicity and concavity of v, and di↵erentiability of V
We first show that v is strictly increasing and strictly concave with respect to e in a compact
interval [emin, emax].
The argument is very similar to the one in Cooley and Quadrini (2001), so we report here
the essential steps. If v is concave and v(0)   0, then V is strictly increasing and concave
because the payo↵ function (w  e)++(w  e) (1+ ) is strictly increasing and concave. As
ew is strictly increasing, then V   ew is strictly increasing. Therefore, the resulting function
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Tv is strictly increasing.
We now show that v is concave. Cooley and Quadrini (2001), on pp 1306-1307, impose
some restrictions on the (conditional) probability distribution of z0,  (dz0|z). Under these
restrictions, to establish strict concavity of V   ew with respect to (k, b) it is su cient to
show that
R ew(z0, k, b, h) (dz0|z) is strictly concave with respect to (k, b). Because we adopt
the same distributional assumption on z0 as in Cooley and Quadrini (2001), in particular we
assume that the conditional distribution of log(z0) is Normal, the argument is valid also in
our case.
This approach is required because ew is not strictly concave. To see this, consider for
simplicity the case h > H (and so drop the dependence of h for brevity),9 and for a given
z let’s choose two arbitrary points (k1, b1) and (k2, b2). Then, consider convex combinations
(k✓, b✓) = ✓(k1, b1) + (1  ✓)(k2, b2) for arbitrary ✓ 2 [0, 1]. Let’s define the function
 (z) = ew(z, k✓, b✓)  ✓ ew(z, k1, b1)  (1  ✓) ew(z, k2, b2).
Clearly, if ew was concave with respect to (k, b) at z, it would be  (z)   0 for all ✓ 2 [0, 1].
However, for low enough z, it can happen that  (z) < 0 for some ✓. To show this, assume
that ew(z, k1, b1) = wd(z), that ew(z, k2, b2) = a(z, k2)   b > wd(z), and that for some ✓,ew(z, k✓, b✓) = wd(z). Then, in this case
 (z) = (1  ✓) [wd(z)  a(z, k2) + b]  0.
This is the reason why Cooley and Quadrini (2001) assume that the probability distribution
of z is such that liquidation, which is where ew is locally convex, is an event occurring with
su ciently low probability, and that overall the function ew is on average ‘more convex than
concave’ with respect to (k, b).
We show that
R ew(z0, k, b, h) (dz0|z) is strictly concave with respect to (k, b). From a
9The argument against concavity of ew can be made also in the case h  H.
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direct calculation, we have







[wd(zd) + (z   zd)k↵ + (b  br)] (dz0|z) +
Z 1
zr
[wd(zd) + (z   zd)k↵] (dz0|z)
= (1   )k   b+ E [z0|z] k↵ + k↵
Z zd
0




The first part, (1    )k   b + E [z0|z] k↵, is concave in (k, b). The second part, k↵ R zd0 (zd  
z0) (dz0|z), under the distributional assumptions, is not very sensitive to changes in (k, b),




not very sensitive to changes in (k, b) because br is continuous and the di↵erence between b
and br is not very sensitive to changes in (k, b). Therefore, as in Cooley and Quadrini (2001),
the dominating part of
R ew(z0, k, b, h) (dz0|z) is concave, which is what we need.
Given strict monotonicity and concavity of v, the correspondence of the optimal policy is
single-valued (i.e., for each (z, w) there is only one (k0, b0) that maximizes (18)). Moreover,
the policy function is the one characterized by Cooley and Quadrini (2001), with a lower
threshold emin below which the firm issues equity and an upper threshold emax above which
the firm pays out cash.
Finally, we can establish di↵erentiability of V from di↵erentiability of v, which is a con-
sequence of Theorem 9.10 in Stokey and Lucas (1989), and the fact that the payo↵ function
of problem (27) is di↵erentiable for values of e 6= w, as at e = w there is a kink.
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(xt, zt). Net worth








• If debt is repaid: dt is the solution of
(7); et = wt   dt.
• If debt is successfully renegotiated:
net worth is reset to
wrt = a(xtzt, kt)  brt, with brt from
(3); dt is the solution of (7) at
(xt, zt, wrt); et = wrt   dt.
• If firm is liquidated, it is replaced by
a new firm with et = wd.
Investment/financing
decision:
Given et, the owner
decides kt+1 and bt+1
according to (8),
subject to the bud-














Fig. 2. Firm owner’s default decision tree (for b > 0)
if (1  ⇠)a < b if (1  ⇠)a   b








(1  )V (x, z, wr) 
V (x, z, w)
(1  )V (x, z, wr) >
V (x, z, w)
V (x, z, w) < 0 V (x, z, w)   0
V = V (x, z, w)
(repay)




V = V (x, z, w)
(repay)
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Fig. 3. Comparative statics with respect to the productivity shock z.
This figure is based on the solution of the model, using the base case parameters in Table 2, and shows di↵erent metrics against
current productivity z for fixed values (k, b, h) of current capital, current debt, and current hedge ratio, respectively. Empty
circles and diamonds denote the behavior of a financially healthy firm. Solid circles and diamonds indicate that the firm chooses
to renegotiate its debt at this point. The plots show firm value (v +m0), equity value (v), hedge ratio (h0), book value of debt
(b0), capital stock (k0), and quasi-market leverage (b0/(b0 + v)).

































































































































k = 11.12, b = 13.12, h = 0.97
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Fig. 4. Comparative statics with respect to the productivity shock z: Small firm, no debt.
This figure is based on the solution of the model, using the base case parameters in Table 2, and plots di↵erent metrics against
current productivity z for fixed values (k, b, h) of current capital, current debt, and current hedge ratio, respectively. The plots
show firm value (v+m0), equity value (v), hedge ratio (h0), book value of debt (b0), capital stock (k0), and quasi-market leverage
(b0/(b0 + v)).










































































































































k = 6.57, b = 0.00, h = 0.00
54
Fig. 5. Value e↵ect for di↵erent values of the productivity shock z: Small firm, no debt.
This figure is based on the solution of the model using the base case parameters in Table 2. It shows the di↵erence between firm
value (v + m0) for a with-CDS firm and firm value for a no-CDS company, for di↵erent levels of current productivity z. The
values of current capital, current debt, and the current hedge ratio, (k, b, h), are fixed.
























k = 6.57, b = 0.00, h = 0.00
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Fig. 6. Comparative statics with respect to the productivity shock z: Large firm, no debt.
This figure is based on the solution of the model, using the base case parameters in Table 2, and plots di↵erent metrics against
current productivity z for fixed values (k, b, h) of current capital, current debt, and current hedge ratio, respectively. The plots
show firm value (v+m0), equity value (v), hedge ratio (h0), book value of debt (b0), capital stock (k0), and quasi-market leverage
(b0/(b0 + v)).










































































































































k = 11.12, b = 0.00, h = 0.00
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Fig. 7. Comparative statics with respect to the productivity shock z: Small firm, high debt.
This figure is based on the solution of the model, using the base case parameters in Table 2, and plots di↵erent metrics against
current productivity z for fixed values (k, b, h) of current capital, current debt, and current hedge ratio, respectively. Empty
circles and diamonds denote the behavior of a financially healthy firm. Solid circles and diamonds indicate that the firm chooses
to renegotiate its debt at this point. The plots show firm value (v +m0), equity value (v), hedge ratio (h0), book value of debt
(b0), capital stock (k0), and quasi-market leverage (b0/(b0 + v)).





























































































































k = 6.57, b = 8.44, h = 1.00
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Fig. 8. Evolution of capital over time.
This figure is based on the solution of the model, using the base case parameters in Table 2,
and shows the evolution of capital over time. The solid red line shows the economy with
CDSs, while the dotted blue line shows the economy without CDSs. Plot (a) shows the
evolution of capital after entry for the average firm, where the average is calculated over
di↵erent simulated paths for z. The starting value of log z is  0.381, which is below the
unconditional mean of log z. Plot (b) shows the evolution of capital where the firms are
selected in both economies (with and without CDSs) conditional on the same value of capital,
and are observed over the next periods. As before, the lines represent averages over di↵erent
simulated paths for z.













(a) Evolution of firms after entry.
no CDS
with CDS




















Table 1: Summary Statistics for a Sample of U.S. Corporations. The sample is constructed by merging the annual Compustat
data with CRSP data, using the sample period 1994–2013. The variables are the investment rate (the di↵erence between CAPX and the
sale of PPE divided by lagged gross PPE), operating profitability (operating profit divided by lagged total assets), the Q–Ratio (the sum
of the market value of equity from CRSP and liabilities divided by total assets), book leverage (liabilities divided by total assets), market
leverage (liabilities divided by the sum of liabilities and the market value of equity), the payout ratio (dividends plus repurchases minus
stock issuance, divided by lagged assets), and the depreciation rate (depreciation and amortization minus amortization of intangibles,
divided by lagged gross PPE). Equity issuance costs are calculated using data on seasoned equity o↵erings from the SDC Platinum Global
New Issuance database. We remove firms from the SDC sample if they are not in the CRSP-Compustat sample. Equity issuance costs
are defined as total fees divided by total proceeds in equity o↵erings. To calculate the bankruptcy rate, we determine for each firm-year
observation whether the firm has filed for bankruptcy in that year. All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
Mean SD 25th Perc. Median 75th Perc. Observations
Investment Rate 0.1861 0.2688 0.0535 0.1036 0.2035 69,110
Operating Profitability 0.0550 0.2676 0.0068 0.1114 0.1888 69,951
Q–Ratio 2.1444 1.8820 1.0963 1.5153 2.3812 79,085
Book Leverage 0.4847 0.2747 0.2736 0.4644 0.6450 80,106
Market Leverage 0.3382 0.2421 0.1324 0.2924 0.5055 79,085
Payout Ratio -0.0446 0.2471 -0.0104 0.0000 0.0191 61,569
Depreciation Rate 0.1360 0.1282 0.0665 0.0980 0.1570 69,539
Bankruptcy Rate 0.0145 NA NA NA NA 1,165
Equity Issuance Costs 0.0536 0.0162 0.0458 0.0554 0.0633 6,636
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Symbol Economic interpretation Value
  Time discount factor for equity holders 0.9434
r Risk-free rate 0.05
⇢ Persistence of productivity shock 0.75
  Conditional volatility of productivity shock 0.21
 (x0|x1) Conditional probability of absorbing shock 0.01
↵ Return to scale 0.475
f Fixed production cost 1.14
  Annual depreciation rate 0.1
  Flotation cost for equity 0.0563
⇠ Proportional liquidation costs 0.42
  Probability of renegotiation failure 0.63
q Bargaining power of debt holders 0.35
Table 2: Base Case Parameter Values. This table provides the base case parameters used in
the simulations.
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Table 3: Economy with and without CDSs: Simulated Moments of Key Metrics. This table provides unconditional sample
moments for the following variables: firm value (v +m0); assets (k); book value of current debt (b); market value of new debt (m0); ex
dividend equity value (v); hedge ratio (h); investment rate ((k0 k(1   ))/k); EBITDA/assets (⇡/k); payouts/assets ((⇡+k(1   ) k0 
b+m0)/k); Q–ratio ((v + b0)/k0); leverage (b0/(b0 + v)); change in debt/assets ((b0   b)/k); credit spread (b0/m  (1 + r), in basis points);
renegotiation (annual frequency of renegotiation); liquidation (the annual frequency of liquidation); and abandonment (the percentage of
times the firm ceases to exists because the asset is negative while there is no debt). The columns report several unconditional moments
(“SD” is the standard deviation) and unconditional percentiles based on simulation using the base parameters shown in Table 2. All
moments are reported on an annual basis.
No CDS With CDS
Mean SD 25th Median 75th Mean SD 25th Median 75th Value E↵ect
Firm Value 15.63 6.90 11.10 14.50 19.07 16.08 6.74 11.82 14.72 19.27 2.92%
Assets 8.83 4.52 5.86 8.02 11.12 9.14 4.35 6.45 8.10 11.18
Current Debt (book) 9.55 4.88 6.50 8.44 11.40 11.32 5.08 8.29 10.31 13.22
New Debt (market) 9.01 4.60 6.13 7.95 10.75 10.67 4.79 7.81 9.71 12.47
Equity 6.62 2.37 4.96 6.55 8.40 5.41 2.00 3.99 5.01 6.82
Hedge Ratio 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.93 0.08 0.93 0.95 0.97
Investment/Assets 0.17 0.39 -0.15 0.10 0.45 0.16 0.35 -0.13 0.10 0.38
EBITDA/Assets 0.18 0.11 0.12 0.19 0.26 0.18 0.11 0.13 0.19 0.25
Payouts/Assets 0.02 0.12 -0.03 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.13 -0.05 0.02 0.07
Q–Ratio 1.83 0.13 1.71 1.81 1.89 1.80 0.09 1.73 1.82 1.83
Market Leverage 0.58 0.03 0.56 0.57 0.60 0.67 0.02 0.66 0.67 0.69
Chg. Debt/Assets 0.07 0.42 -0.25 0.00 0.33 0.06 0.40 -0.25 0.00 0.32
Credit Spread (bps) 109.30 5.66 106.26 106.96 108.40 109.76 6.53 106.28 107.74 109.14
Renegotiation (pct) 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Liquidation (pct) 1.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Abandonment (pct) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 4: E↵ect of CDSs on Firm Value: Sensitivity Analysis. This table provides unconditional sample moments for firm value
(v +m0). The columns report the mean, median, and standard deviation of firm value. The last column provides p-values for a t-test
that compares the mean of the no-CDS firm value to the mean of the with-CDS firm value. The table presents results using the base case
parameters shown in Table 2, along with the deviations from the base case parameters, changing only the parameter in the first column.
No CDS With CDS
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD p-Value Value E↵ect
Base case 15.63 14.50 6.90 16.08 14.72 6.74 0.00 2.92%
q = 0.3 15.65 14.55 6.89 16.08 14.72 6.74 0.00 2.76%
q = 0.4 15.85 14.59 6.84 16.08 14.72 6.74 0.00 1.45%
⇠ = 0.38 15.76 14.58 6.93 16.09 14.72 6.74 0.00 2.09%
⇠ = 0.46 15.47 14.07 6.99 16.08 14.72 6.74 0.00 3.99%
  = 0.58 15.71 14.55 6.90 16.08 14.72 6.75 0.00 2.37%
  = 0.68 15.87 14.60 6.82 16.09 14.72 6.74 0.00 1.40%
  = 0.05 15.63 14.50 6.92 16.10 14.76 6.74 0.00 3.02%
  = 0.06 15.50 14.34 6.98 16.05 14.70 6.76 0.00 3.55%
  = 0.945 16.02 14.79 6.84 16.21 14.88 6.76 0.00 1.19%
  = 0.942 15.45 14.37 6.89 15.80 14.55 6.79 0.00 2.27%
r = 0.045 17.91 16.80 7.04 18.25 17.03 7.00 0.00 1.90%
r = 0.055 14.23 13.00 6.45 14.29 12.77 6.49 0.00 0.42%
⇢ = 0.73 15.32 14.37 6.16 15.48 13.70 6.21 0.00 1.01%
⇢ = 0.77 16.18 14.84 7.72 16.44 14.99 7.64 0.00 1.60%
  = 0.18 14.40 13.75 5.68 14.66 13.89 5.61 0.00 1.78%
  = 0.24 17.29 15.57 8.19 17.42 15.74 8.30 0.00 0.79%
↵ = 0.45 11.68 10.26 5.63 11.88 10.75 5.55 0.00 1.73%
↵ = 0.5 21.08 19.51 8.55 21.45 19.75 8.40 0.00 1.75%
f = 1 18.00 16.78 6.78 18.09 17.02 6.93 0.00 0.54%
f = 1.3 12.90 11.34 7.08 13.40 11.39 6.81 0.00 3.84%
  = 0.09 18.31 17.04 7.61 18.61 17.25 7.71 0.00 1.67%
  = 0.11 13.51 12.54 5.98 13.69 12.65 6.27 0.00 1.37%
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Table 5: Small Firms. In the simulated economy, we perform a 4 ⇥ 3 double sort on k and z, and select observations in the second bin
for k and the second bin for z. This table provides sample moments for the following variables: firm value (v+m0); assets (k); book value
of current debt (b); market value of new debt (m0); ex dividend equity value (v); hedge ratio (h); investment rate ((k0   k(1    ))/k);
EBITDA/assets (⇡/k); payouts/assets ((⇡ + k(1    )   k0   b +m0)/k); Q–ratio ((v + b0)/k0); market leverage (b0/(b0 + v)); change in
debt/assets ((b0   b)/k); credit spread (b0/m   (1 + r), in basis points); renegotiation (annual frequency of renegotiation); liquidation
(annual frequency of liquidation). All moments are reported on an annual basis.
No CDS With CDS
Mean Median SD Obs. Mean Median SD Obs. p-Value Value E↵ect
Firm Value 12.71 11.17 1.62 31426 13.22 11.96 1.38 21368 0.00 4.00%
Assets 6.34 5.91 0.64 31426 6.57 6.57 0.00 21368 0.00
Current Debt (book) 7.11 6.56 0.83 31426 8.46 8.44 0.13 21368 0.00
New Debt (market) 7.04 6.19 0.91 31426 8.75 7.95 0.88 21368 0.00
Equity 5.67 5.27 0.74 31426 4.47 4.00 0.51 21368 0.00
Hedge Ratio 0.00 0.00 0.00 31426 0.97 1.00 0.03 21368 0.00
Investment/Assets 0.19 0.10 0.20 31122 0.21 0.10 0.12 21150 0.00
EBITDA/Assets 0.17 0.13 0.03 31122 0.16 0.13 0.03 21150 0.00
Payouts/Assets -0.03 -0.03 0.03 31122 0.00 -0.04 0.05 21150 0.00
Q-Ratio 1.86 1.89 0.05 31426 1.82 1.82 0.01 21368 0.00
Market Leverage 0.57 0.57 0.01 31426 0.68 0.68 0.01 21368 0.00
Chg. Debt/Assets 0.07 0.00 0.19 31122 0.13 0.00 0.14 21150 0.00
Credit Spread (bps) 107.55 107.74 1.21 31426 108.62 108.22 0.50 21368 0.00
Renegotiation (pct) 0.00 31426 0.00 21368
Liquidation (pct) 0.97 31426 1.02 21368
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Table 6: Large Firms. In the simulated economy, we perform a 4 ⇥ 3 double sort on k and z, and select observations in the third bin
for k and the second bin for z. This table provides sample moments for the following variables: firm value (v+m0); assets (k); book value
of current debt (b); market value of new debt (m0); ex dividend equity value (v); hedge ratio (h); investment rate ((k0   k(1    ))/k);
EBITDA/assets (⇡/k); payouts/assets ((⇡ + k(1    )   k0   b +m0)/k); Q–ratio ((v + b0)/k0); market leverage (b0/(b0 + v)); change in
debt/assets ((b0   b)/k); credit spread (b0/m   (1 + r), in basis points); renegotiation (annual frequency of renegotiation); liquidation
(annual frequency of liquidation). All moments are reported on an annual basis.
No CDS With CDS
Mean Median SD Obs. Mean Median SD Obs. p-Value Value E↵ect
Firm Value 13.27 14.59 1.70 24233 13.62 14.73 1.38 29680 0.00 2.67%
Assets 8.53 8.11 0.79 24233 8.29 8.11 0.56 29680 0.00
Current Debt (book) 8.87 8.44 0.81 24233 10.43 10.31 0.63 29680 0.00
New Debt (market) 7.24 7.96 0.94 24233 8.96 9.72 0.89 29680 0.00
Equity 6.02 6.64 0.78 24233 4.66 5.01 0.54 29680 0.00
Hedge Ratio 0.00 0.00 0.00 24233 0.96 0.93 0.03 29680 0.00
Investment/Assets -0.04 -0.09 0.15 23991 0.01 0.10 0.11 29398 0.00
EBITDA/Assets 0.17 0.18 0.03 23991 0.17 0.19 0.03 29398 0.48
Payouts/Assets 0.03 0.03 0.01 23991 -0.01 0.02 0.04 29398 0.00
Q-Ratio 1.84 1.80 0.06 24233 1.82 1.82 0.02 29680 0.00
Market Leverage 0.56 0.56 0.01 24233 0.67 0.67 0.01 29680 0.00
Chg. Debt/Assets -0.13 -0.19 0.14 23991 -0.11 0.00 0.12 29398 0.00
Credit Spread (bps) 106.80 106.16 0.84 24233 108.63 109.14 0.73 29680 0.00
Renegotiation (pct) 0.00 24233 0.00 29680
Liquidation (pct) 1.00 24233 0.95 29680
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Table 7: Low Payout Ratio. In the simulated economy, we select observations with a payout ratio in the bottom tercile group. This
table provides sample moments for the following variables: firm value (v+m0); assets (k); book value of current debt (b); market value of
new debt (m0); ex dividend equity value (v); hedge ratio (h); investment rate ((k0   k(1   ))/k); EBITDA/assets (⇡/k); payouts/assets
((⇡ + k(1    )   k0   b +m0)/k); Q–ratio ((v + b0)/k0); market leverage (b0/(b0 + v)); change in debt/assets ((b0   b)/k); credit spread
(b0/m   (1 + r), in basis points); renegotiation (annual frequency of renegotiation); liquidation (annual frequency of liquidation). All
moments are reported on an annual basis.
No CDS With CDS
Mean Median SD Obs. Mean Median SD Obs. p-Value Value E↵ect
Firm Value 9.86 11.17 2.81 65825 10.27 11.96 2.41 65703 0.00 4.24%
Assets 5.45 5.91 1.97 65763 6.62 6.57 2.66 66877 0.00
Current Debt (book) 6.12 6.56 2.11 65763 8.50 8.44 3.17 66877 0.00
New Debt (market) 5.37 6.19 1.59 65825 6.77 7.95 1.68 65703 0.00
Equity 4.49 4.98 1.22 65825 3.50 4.00 0.77 65703 0.00
Hedge Ratio 0.00 0.00 0.00 65825 0.89 0.93 0.14 65703 0.00
Investment/Assets 0.11 0.10 0.35 65825 0.00 -0.09 0.27 65703 0.00
EBITDA/Assets 0.08 0.11 0.09 65825 0.08 0.13 0.08 65703 0.73
Payouts/Assets -0.10 -0.04 0.09 65825 -0.12 -0.07 0.10 65703 0.00
Q-Ratio 1.94 1.89 0.10 65825 1.86 1.82 0.05 65703 0.00
Market Leverage 0.56 0.56 0.02 65825 0.67 0.68 0.03 65703 0.00
Chg. Debt/Assets -0.01 0.00 0.36 65825 -0.13 -0.23 0.31 65703 0.00
Credit Spread (bps) 111.72 107.74 7.75 65825 113.26 108.22 9.22 65703 0.00
Renegotiation (pct) 0.08 65825 0.03 65703
Liquidation (pct) 0.00 65825 0.00 65703
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Table 8: High Payout Ratio. In the simulated economy, we select observations with a payout ratio in the top tercile group. This
table provides sample moments for the following variables: firm value (v+m0); assets (k); book value of current debt (b); market value of
new debt (m0); ex dividend equity value (v); hedge ratio (h); investment rate ((k0   k(1   ))/k); EBITDA/assets (⇡/k); payouts/assets
((⇡ + k(1    )   k0   b +m0)/k); Q–ratio ((v + b0)/k0); market leverage (b0/(b0 + v)); change in debt/assets ((b0   b)/k); credit spread
(b0/m   (1 + r), in basis points); renegotiation (annual frequency of renegotiation); liquidation (annual frequency of liquidation). All
moments are reported on an annual basis.
No CDS With CDS
Mean Median SD Obs. Mean Median SD Obs. p-Value Value E↵ect
Firm Value 22.71 23.35 6.21 67506 22.44 23.51 6.50 68187 0.00 -1.22%
Assets 11.67 11.12 4.66 67427 11.13 11.12 4.78 68118 0.00
Current Debt (book) 12.47 11.25 5.18 67427 13.58 13.12 5.59 68118 0.00
New Debt (market) 13.67 14.14 4.56 67506 15.12 15.91 4.90 68187 0.00
Equity 9.04 9.21 1.70 67506 7.32 7.60 1.63 68187 0.00
Hedge Ratio 0.00 0.00 0.00 67506 0.95 0.95 0.01 68187 0.00
Investment/Assets 0.35 0.33 0.41 67506 0.38 0.33 0.36 68187 0.00
EBITDA/Assets 0.29 0.27 0.07 67506 0.28 0.28 0.07 68187 0.00
Payouts/Assets 0.13 0.08 0.09 67506 0.14 0.08 0.09 68187 0.00
Q-Ratio 1.70 1.70 0.06 67506 1.72 1.71 0.06 68187 0.00
Market Leverage 0.61 0.62 0.03 67506 0.68 0.69 0.02 68187 0.00
Chg. Debt/Assets 0.28 0.30 0.44 67506 0.33 0.29 0.41 68187 0.00
Credit Spread (bps) 107.27 106.69 1.71 67506 106.91 106.60 1.11 68187 0.00
Renegotiation (pct) 0.00 67506 0.00 68187
Liquidation (pct) 0.00 67506 0.00 68187
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Table 9: Low Productivity. In the simulated economy, we perform a 3 ⇥ 4 double sort on k and z, and select observations in the second
bin for k and the second bin for z. This table provides sample moments for the following variables: firm value (v +m0); assets (k); book
value of current debt (b); market value of new debt (m0); ex dividend equity value (v); hedge ratio (h); investment rate ((k0 k(1  ))/k);
EBITDA/assets (⇡/k); payouts/assets ((⇡ + k(1    )   k0   b +m0)/k); Q–ratio ((v + b0)/k0); market leverage (b0/(b0 + v)); change in
debt/assets ((b0   b)/k); credit spread (b0/m   (1 + r), in basis points); renegotiation (annual frequency of renegotiation); liquidation
(annual frequency of liquidation). All moments are reported on an annual basis.
No CDS With CDS
Mean Median SD Obs. Mean Median SD Obs. p-Value Value E↵ect
Firm Value 11.15 11.17 0.10 23432 11.93 11.96 0.13 23178 0.00 7.00%
Assets 6.86 5.91 0.99 23432 7.40 8.11 0.90 23178 0.00
Current Debt (book) 7.47 6.56 0.92 23432 9.41 9.38 1.04 23178 0.00
New Debt (market) 6.16 6.19 0.15 23432 7.92 7.95 0.18 23178 0.00
Equity 4.99 4.98 0.05 23432 4.01 4.00 0.05 23178 0.00
Hedge Ratio 0.00 0.00 0.00 23432 0.99 1.00 0.02 23178 0.00
Investment/Assets -0.02 -0.09 0.13 23228 -0.00 -0.09 0.11 22974 0.00
EBITDA/Assets 0.13 0.13 0.00 23228 0.13 0.13 0.00 22974 0.00
Payouts/Assets -0.02 -0.03 0.04 23228 -0.05 -0.04 0.02 22974 0.00
Q-Ratio 1.89 1.89 0.02 23432 1.83 1.82 0.02 23178 0.00
Market Leverage 0.57 0.57 0.01 23432 0.68 0.68 0.01 23178 0.00
Chg. Debt/Assets -0.12 -0.23 0.12 23228 -0.12 -0.23 0.12 22974 0.17
Credit Spread (bps) 107.74 107.74 0.01 23432 108.19 108.22 0.15 23178 0.00
Renegotiation (pct) 0.00 23432 0.00 23178
Liquidation (pct) 0.87 23432 0.88 23178
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Table 10: High Productivity. In the simulated economy, we perform a 3 ⇥ 4 double sort on k and z, and select observations in
the second bin for k and the third bin for z. This table provides sample moments for the following variables: firm value (v + m0);
assets (k); book value of current debt (b); market value of new debt (m0); ex dividend equity value (v); hedge ratio (h); investment
rate ((k0   k(1    ))/k); EBITDA/assets (⇡/k); payouts/assets ((⇡ + k(1    )   k0   b +m0)/k); Q–ratio ((v + b0)/k0); market leverage
(b0/(b0 + v)); change in debt/assets ((b0   b)/k); credit spread (b0/m   (1 + r), in basis points); renegotiation (annual frequency of
renegotiation); liquidation (annual frequency of liquidation). All moments are reported on an annual basis.
No CDS With CDS
Mean Median SD Obs. Mean Median SD Obs. p-Value Value E↵ect
Firm Value 14.43 14.59 0.33 26780 14.72 14.73 0.07 27870 0.00 2.03%
Assets 7.12 7.29 0.98 26780 7.70 8.11 0.97 27870 0.00
Current Debt (book) 7.72 8.44 0.90 26780 9.77 10.31 1.10 27870 0.00
New Debt (market) 7.95 7.96 0.00 26780 9.67 9.72 0.20 27870 0.00
Equity 6.48 6.64 0.33 26780 5.05 5.01 0.20 27870 0.00
Hedge Ratio 0.00 0.00 0.00 26780 0.93 0.93 0.00 27870 0.00
Investment/Assets 0.24 0.10 0.18 26496 0.17 0.10 0.13 27574 0.00
EBITDA/Assets 0.20 0.20 0.00 26496 0.19 0.19 0.00 27574 0.00
Payouts/Assets 0.01 0.03 0.03 26496 0.03 0.02 0.02 27574 0.00
Q-Ratio 1.82 1.80 0.03 26780 1.82 1.82 0.01 27870 0.31
Market Leverage 0.57 0.56 0.01 26780 0.67 0.67 0.01 27870 0.00
Chg. Debt/Assets 0.12 0.00 0.15 26496 0.08 0.00 0.15 27574 0.00
Credit Spread (bps) 106.87 106.16 1.43 26780 108.99 109.14 0.66 27870 0.00
Renegotiation (pct) 0.00 26780 0.00 27870
Liquidation (pct) 1.06 26780 1.06 27870
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Table 11: Simulated regressions for the determinants of the hedge ratio. This table
presents simulated regression results for the determinants of the bondholders’ hedge ratio. The
dependent variable is the hedge ratio h. The independent variables are Market leverage (b0/(b0+v))
and Q–Ratio ((v + b0)/k0). The numerical procedure to solve the model and to simulate data is
described in Appendix A. We simulate 2,000 firms over 1,000 periods and only keep firms after they










Adj. R2 0.021 0.096
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Table 12: Summary statistics for the DTCC sample. This sample is created by merging firms in the DTCC database with firms
in our Compustat/CRSP sample in Table 1. The main variable is NetNotional/Debt, a proxy for the hedge ratio, defined as the net
notional amount of CDS contracts outstanding for firm i in year t, divided by the sum of debt in current liabilities and long-term debt.
The other variables are Market leverage (total liabilities divided by the sum of total liabilities and the market value of equity), Q–Ratio
(the sum of market equity, debt in current liabilities, and long-term debt, divided by total assets), Non-fixed assets (1 - net PPE / total
assets), and Size (log of total assets). The sample period starts in 2008, which is when the DTCC started publishing the amount of CDSs
outstanding, and ends in 2013, as in the body of the paper. NetNotional/Debt, Q–Ratio, and Size are winsorized at the 1% and the 99%
levels. Market leverage and Non-fixed assets are truncated at zero and one. The variables NetNotional and Debt are measured in USD
millions.
Mean SD Min. 25th Perc. Median 75th Perc. Max. Observations
NetNotional/Debt 0.2826 0.3996 0.0083 0.0618 0.1399 0.3319 2.6538 1,481
NetNotional 925 834 48 408 716 1,151 7,916 1,481
Debt 16,976 66,276 210 2,038 4,441 10,077 763,230 1,481
Market leverage 0.5484 0.2081 0.0721 0.3762 0.5366 0.6946 0.9947 1,481
Q–Ratio 1.0370 0.5605 0.0977 0.6973 0.8970 1.2551 3.2648 1,481
Non-fixed assets 0.6799 0.2486 0.1012 0.4545 0.7322 0.9008 1.0000 1,481
Size 9.7549 1.3068 7.2484 8.8648 9.6543 10.5353 14.0863 1,481
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Table 13: Empirical determinants of the hedge ratio. This table presents regression results
for the determinants of the bondholders’ aggregate hedge ratio. The dependent variable is Net-
Notional/Debt, a proxy for the hedge ratio, defined as the net notional amount of CDS contracts
outstanding for firm i in year t, divided by the sum of debt in current liabilities and long-term debt.
The independent variables areMarket leverage (total liabilities divided by the sum of total liabilities
and the market value of equity), Q–Ratio (the sum of market equity, debt in current liabilities, and
long-term debt, divided by total assets), Non-fixed assets (1 - net PPE / total assets), and Size
(log of total assets). The sample period starts in 2008, which is when the DTCC started publishing
the amount of CDSs outstanding, and ends in 2013, as in the body of the paper. The numbers in
parentheses denote standard errors. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is denoted
by ⇤, ⇤⇤, and ⇤⇤⇤, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 1.759⇤⇤⇤ 1.997⇤⇤⇤ 1.633⇤⇤⇤







Size  0.160⇤⇤⇤  0.164⇤⇤⇤  0.163⇤⇤⇤
Size (0.007)⇤⇤⇤ (0.007)⇤⇤⇤ (0.007)⇤⇤⇤
Adj. R2 0.27 0.29 0.32
Obs. 1481 1481 1481
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